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ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following
are parties to the proceedings:
1. Appellants (Hereinafter "defendants"): John York and Lesa York.
2. Appellees (Hereinafter "plaintiffs'-): Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc.,
and Walker & Company Real Estate.
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred in the Utah Court of Appeals by §78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah
Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES, AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Did the Trial Court err in concluding that the subject real property was

"sold to a tenant" within the meaning of the parties real estate listing agreement, thus
triggering a second commission from defendants to plaintiffs, where defendants did not
sell the subject real property to the tenant MATC, but rather sold the subject property to
Alpine School District, which had a lease-purchase agreement with the tenant MATC to
which defendants were not a party? The issue regarding payment of the second
commission was preserved as it was the focus of the entire trial. (R. 506- 1-176).
Defendants argued that this action was limited to a breach of contract case. (R 506 p. 163
6-21). Defendants argued regarding construction of the Modified Listing Agreement. (R.
506 172 -21 to R. 173-6). Defendants specifically argued against applying the conduct of
MATC, Alpine School District and UVSC to defendants. (R.0506 p. 163 15-21, R. 0506
p. 172, 3-8,). See also (R. 506 p. 172 9-20, R. 506 p. 172-21 to 173-12). The standard
of review where contract interpretation is a matter of law, is a review for correctness
giving the trial court no deference. Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104, 161 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22; 1991 Utah LEXIS 41, Gillmor v. Macey 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57,
533 Utah Adv. Rep. 13; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 349.
B.

Did the trial court err in determining that the subject real property was
l

"sold to a tenant" within the meaning of the parties real estate listing agreement, thus
triggering a second commission from defendants to plaintiffs, where tenant MATC had
no statutory authority to purchase the subject real property or enter into a lease-purchase
agreement at the time Defendants sold the subject real property to Alpine School
District? The evidence at trial was that MATC had no authority from the legislature to
purchase property. (R.506 p. 89: 1-10). At trial the evidence was that MATC was not
given authority to do capital leases until after the time of the lease between MATC and
Alpine School District. (R. 506 p. 109:23 to 110:110:14). Defendants argued that at the
time of the lease between Alpine School District and MATC, there was no legislative
authority for MATC to purchase the property as the amended UCA 53B-2A-113 did not
go into effect until 2005. (R. 506 p. 173: 14-24).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following controlling statutes and rules are contained in the Addenda:
Constitutions: None
Statutes: UCA § 53B-2-101
UCA§53B-2a-113
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
The case at bar is based on the alleged breach of a real estate listing contract
between defendants John and Lisa York and plaintiffs Tom Heal Commercial Real
Estate, Inc. and Walker & Company Commercial Real Estate, Inc.
2

Proceedings Below.
A one day bench trial was held by the court. Plaintiffs prevailed at that trial. (R. at
340).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as decided by the trial court in its ruling are as follows: Plaintiffs are
licensed real estate agents.(R. 506 p. 17:1-21) Defendants are former owners of the
subject real property, located at 759 East Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah. (R.506 p.
122:19-24). During the year 2000, Defendants retained Blaine Walker, a principle in
Plaintiff Walker and Company Real Estate, and he was hired to list the subject real
property. (R. 506 p 21:22-25, See trial exhibit #2). The listing agreement the parties
signed spanned a nine-month period. (R.506 p 123:23 to 124:1). Before closing on the
lease, Heal informed Defendant John York that the first agreement had expired, and Heal
needed to have Defendants sign another listing agreement. (R. 506 p 25:12 to 26:19, Trial
Exhibit 3, Addendum 1). Although this listing agreement has different compensation
terms than the first listing agreement, not all of those differences were explained to
defendants. (R. 506 p 40:10 to 41:11).
Plaintiffs eventually located a tenant for defendants' property. In July, 2001,
Defendants signed an eleven year lease. (Trial exhibit 6). The listed parties on the lease
are Defendants and UVSC although a signature block was added for MATC. (Trial
exhibit 6). The lease was signed by Brad Cook as representative of both institutions.
(Trial exhibit 6). UVSC and MATC are each legislatively created institutions of higher
3

education. At the time the lease was entered into, MATC was an arm of UVSC who
administered its finances, payroll, and tuition. (R. 506 p. 85:16-21). Sometime later
MATC was made a subsidiary of the Utah Applied Technology College, and was
renamed Mountainland Applied Technology College. This action made MATC
independent of UVSC. At that time MATC was given its own budget. (R. 506 p. 102:810).
After the change in its status, MATC continued to pay rent to Yorks. (R. 506 p.
88:12-14). Approximately two years into the lease MATC began to discuss purchase of
the property, although it was unable to do so since it did not have the right, absent
legislative action, to purchase real property. (R. 506 p. 87:17-20). At that time, MATC
did not have a budget for capital purchase and it required legislative action prior to
purchase of property. (R. 506 p. 89:1-10). As part of the discussion of purchase, MATC
discussed terminating the lease if Yorks were unwilling to sell. (R. 506 p. 103:1-8).
MATC contacted Alpine School District regarding a purchase in order to avoid
seeking legislative approvals. (R. 506 p. 87:17-19, 103:9-20). Alpine School District
purchased the property from Yorks, and Alpine School District and MATC entered into a
lease purchase agreement. (Trial exhibit 16). MATC is still a tenant of Alpine School
District. (R. 506 p. 104:1-6). Based on the sale from Defendants to Alpine School
District, plaintiffs have claimed a second real estate commission based on a provision in
the Modified Listing Agreement providing for an additional 6% commission in the case
of a sale to a tenant. (R. 506 p. 36:1 to 37:4).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The sole issue before the trial court was whether or not defendants owe plaintiffs a
second broker's commission to plaintiffs. The pertinent facts are that in May 2004,
defendants sold their property to Alpine School District, who had a lease-purchase
agreement with MATC, which was a tenant. In its findings of fact, the trial court found
that the sale by defendants to Alpine School District was not a sale to a tenant. (R. at
335). The Trial Court's analysis should have ended there, but instead went on to find that
the subject real property was "sold to a tenant" within the meaning of the Modified
Listing Agreement because of Alpine School District's lease-purchase agreement with
MATC. On the basis of that transaction, defendants were held liable to pay a second
commission to plaintiffs. (R. at 340-330).
In reaching this decision, rather than interpreting the contract as a whole, and
looking at its intent, the court based its decision on a single phrase within the contract
that states: "In the event the property is sold to a tenant during the term of the lease or
within 180 days of expiration of the lease or any renewals thereof, the Seller shall pay to
The Company a commission equal to six percent (6%) of the sale price." (Trial exhibit 3
at paragraph 2). The court held that because Alpine School District in effect sold the
subject real property to MATC via an installment sale, Defendants, despite the fact that
they were not parties to that transaction, owe a second commission to plaintiffs. The
transactions can therefore be outlined as A to B, then B to C, with the transaction from B
to C triggering the second commission by "A".
5

The complaint in this matter was based on breach of contract, and breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. at 25). There is no claim in the complaint,
and are no findings of improper acts on the part of the defendants. The trial and
subsequent ruling were based on contract.
What the trial court did in this matter was isolate a single term from the Modified
Listing Agreement, and use that phrase to detennine liability rather than interpreting the
contract as a whole. The principles set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202
(1979), are helpful in interpreting the contract as required by Utah law. The principles
from the Restatement that are pertinent to analysis of the Modified Listing Agreement
can paraphrased as follows: Words are to be given ordinary meaning, and the principal
purpose of the parties if ascertainable is given great weight. Writings are to be
interpreted as a whole. Language is to be given its generally prevailing meaning.
Repeated occasions of performance are to be given great weight in interpretation of the
contract. Finally, whenever reasonable, the intentions of the parties are interpreted as
consistent with each other, and any course of performance dealing and trade.
In examining the ruling of the court, it is clear that the trial court did not follow the
principles set forth in the Restatement in interpreting the agreement between the parties.
Examination of the agreement demonstrates that under the agreement, Defendants are
defined as "Sellers", and the basis for the contract is the sale of property owned by
"Sellers" located at 759 East Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah. The problem with the
decision by the trial court is that the decision was not based on an analysis of the entire
6

contract, but instead on a single phrase. Analysis of the contract demonstrates that
liability for commissions is based on the premise that the commission is awarded based
on a sale of Seller's property to a tenant by the Seller not by another party.
In effect, examination of the four corners of the contract demonstrates that there is
an implicit condition present in the agreement, that condition being the requirement that
defendants are the party selling the property to a tenant.
The second basis for review by this court focuses on the validity of the leasepurchase agreement between Alpine School District and MATC. The second
commission in this case is owed only if the property is "sold" to a tenant, and a
transaction is not a "sale" unless it is based upon a valid and enforceable contract. At the
time of the transaction, MATC did not have legal authority to purchase or to enter into a
lease-purchase agreement. Because MATC is a legislatively created entity, any contract
it entered into outside its statutory authority is void as an ultra vires act, and would have
been unenforceable by MATC. Therefore, the lease-purchase agreement was neither
valid nor enforceable, and the Trial Court erred in holding that the lease-purchase
agreement executed by MATC constituted a "sale," triggering a second commission from
Defendants to Heal.
A year after the commencement of the present lawsuit, in Chapter 227 of the 2005
legislative session, the legislature amended the statutes that govern MATC to allow
MATC to enter into lease-purchase agreements such as the one with Alpine, thus
arguably ratifying MATC's ultra vires transaction. This ratification, however, should not
7

require defendants to pay a second commission, first because the Trial Court made no
findings that defendants were aware of the transaction, and second because all parties are
charged with knowledge of the law, wherefore defendants and plaintiffs were charged
with knowing that such a transaction was impossible. In fact, defendants were aware that
MATC had no authority to purchase the property. Further, requiring defendant to be
liable for a second commission based on the act of a third party that was legally
impossible at the time the act was committed, although ratified later, would upset
fundamental notions of justice and fair play and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
In conclusion, it is the defendants' position that "A court is not at liberty to
disregard the language chosen by the parties and broaden the liability in favor of one
party at the expense of the other," Riche v. Jenkins, 641 P.2d 148, 150; 1982 Utah LEXIS
881. The trial court's ruling effectively broadens defendants' liability under the term of
the Modified Lisiting Agreement providing for a second commission in the event that the
subject property is "sold to a tenant" within a specified time period. It does this in two
ways: First, since the court interpreted the term "sold to a tenant" to include sales by
persons other than the "seller" as defined in the contract, failing to interpret that term in
light of the contract as a whole; and second, because it interpreted the term "sold to a
tenant" to include a "sale" based upon a lease-purchase agreement that was invalid and
unenforceable at the time it was consummated. Both of these interpretations of the term
"sold to a tenant" improperly expand defendants' liability under the Modified Listing
Agreement and confer upon plaintiffs a benefit for which they did not bargain.
8

ARGUMENT
The sole issue before the trial court was whether or not defendants owe a second
broker's commission to plaintiffs. If a second commission is owed, the basis for that
commission is a sentence contained within a listing agreement between the parties. For
purposes of this brief, the document titled "Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure"
(Trial exhibit 3, Addendum 1), will be referred to as the "Modified Listing Agreement".
The sentence, found in trial exhibit 3 states as follows: "In the event the property is sold
to a tenant during the term of the lease or within 180 days of expiration of the lease or
any renewals thereof, the Seller shall pay to The Company a commission equal to six
percent (6%) of the sale price." (See Modified Listing Agreement, trial exhibit 3,
addendum 1).
Defendants do not dispute the trial court's findings of fact and do not dispute the
majority of the trial court's conclusions. The trial court correctly concluded that the sale
by defendants to Alpine School District standing alone was not a sale to MATC. (R. at
335). Defendants do not dispute the Trial Court's conclusion that the lease-purchase
agreement between Alpine School District and MATC was, in form, an installment
purchase by MATC from Alpine School District (R. at 337). Defendants do not dispute
the finding that Alpine School District purchased the property for $2,656,000 then
entered into a lease purchase agreement with MATC. 1 (R. 338, first paragraph 17).

1 In part of its ruling the court states that "Alpine's role in the transaction is only that of a financier." (R. 331).
Presumably in this conclusion the court is speaking from an accounting rather than a legal perspective. Otherwise,
this conclusion would be inconsistent with other portions of the court's ruling. For example, the first paragraph 17
(R. 338), acknowledges that Alpine School District was the purchaser. The evidence on this issue was from Senator
9

Defendants do dispute, however, the trial court's final conclusions with respect to
interpretation of the term "sold to a tenant" in the Modified Listing Agreement. It is
defendants' position that the trial court committed error by concluding that the property
was "sold to a tenant" within the meaning of the Modified Listing Agreement, when
defendants did not sell the subject property to the tenant MATC, but rather sold the
property to Alpine School District, which had a lease-purchase agreement writh MATC
that did not involve defendants. It is also defendants' position that the trial court
committed error by interpreting the term "sold to a tenant" to include a lease-purchase
agreement between MATC and Alpine School District at a time when MATC had no
statutory authority to enter into such an agreement.
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS "SOLD TO A TEN ANT" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
MODIFIED LISTING AGREEMENT WHERE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT SELL
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO A TENANT.
The trial court correctly concluded that Defendants sold the property to Alpine
School District, but did not sell the property to MATC, the tenant. Specifically, the
court's heading states: "Despite their cooperation, the purchase by Alpine alone is not a
purchase by MATC." (R. at 335). At trial, plaintiffs proceeded on the theory that
because they had similar goals in educating a portion of the population in Utah County,
Alpine School District and MATC were de facto the same entity, and the sale to Alpine
School District was a sale to MATC. (R. 506 p. 150-162). Defendants opposed this
Kurt Bramble who was testifying from an accounting rather than legal perspective. Senator Bramble testified: ". . .
from a CPA'a perspective, Alpine functioned essentially as the financing a, institution, the bank if you will, and the
property the, the, the effective ownership went from whoever was leasing it to mountainland they were the lessor."
they became the seller, Mountainland became the purchaser with Alpine being the a, financier if you will." (R. 506
p.l20:21 to 121:3).
10

notion arguing that each of the entities involved has a completely separate statutory
identity and that they have no ability to control one another's actions. (R. 506 p. 162:25
to 174:10). In considering whether Alpine School District and MATC were in effect the
same entity, the court found:
The evidence produced at trial established that Alpine bought the Property for the
benefit of MATC and in cooperation with MATC. Nevertheless, 1 am persuaded
that this cooperation does not make Alpine and MATC partners nor joint venturers
in the legal sense that makes one liable for the actions of the other. Although
Alpine was acting on behalf of MATC, the Modified Listing Agreement provides
for a commission only where the tenant itself, not someone acting on the tenant's
behalf, purchases the property. (R. at 335).
From the standpoint of the defendants, where there were no findings of subterfuge, fraud,
or deceit, this finding by the court should have been the end of the dispute. The property
was purchased by Alpine School District, not MATC, (R. 338:17), and no second
commission is owing.
Although it is the defendants' position that the trial court's analysis should have
ended when it determined that the defendants did not sell the subject property to the
tenant MATC, the defendants nevertheless do not dispute the Trial Court's conclusion
that "the lease-purchase agreement between Alpine and MATC purports to be a lease, but
is in fact an installment purchase by MATC," (R. at 336), assuming for the purposes of
this section that the agreement was valid and enforceable. Because "[i]t is the duty of the
court to look to substance rather than form," MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 358 Utah
Adv. Rep. 20; 1998 Utah LEXIS 93, (R. at 331), the trial court concluded that MATC did
not lease the property from Alpine School District, but purchased the property from
ll

Alpine School District, (R. at 331). Defendants contest the conclusion that Alpine School
District was a financier and not the seller in this transaction.
Defendants also dispute the Trial Court's conclusion that the defendants are liable
for a second commission under the Modified Listing Agreement because the defendants
sold the property to Alpine School District and Alpine School District made an
installment sale to the tenant MATC. (R. at 331). In reaching this conclusion, the trial
court should have interpreted the term "sold to a tenant" in light of the purpose and terms
of the contract as a whole to mean that the defendants must be party to any sale that
results in liability for a commission. But instead the court isolated the term "sold to a
tenant" to include a transaction between unrelated entities which neither involved nor
conferred any benefit upon the defendants. This misinterpretation ultimately resulted in
giving the plaintiffs a benefit greater than that which the parties bargained for, because
the terms of the contract interpreted as a whole show that defendants must be party to any
sale that results in liability for a commission.
A.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SELL THE PROPERTY TO MATC.

Upon determining that the sale to Alpine School District was not a sale to a tenant, the
inquiry by the trial court should have ended as the only contractual basis for liability by
defendants was a sale of the property to a tenant. (See addendum 1 paragraph 2). Instead,
the trial court chose to examine the relationship between Alpine School District and
MATC. The court found that the lease agreement between Alpine School District and

12

MATC was an installment sale, and therefore a commission was owing by defendants.
(R. at 333).
In reaching its decision in this matter, the court relied entirely on a transaction
between Alpine School District and MATC that was signed two weeks before the sale to
Alpine School District. (Trial exhibit 16, addendum 2). Close examination of the Alpine
School District/MATC lease agreement, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
court, (R. 4 1 6 - 406), and the ruling, demonstrate that Yorks were not a party to the lease
agreement. (R. at 340-330, addendum 3, "Ruling").
B.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS BASED ONLY ON CONTRACT
AND BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
In considering whether the second commission is owing to plaintiffs, it is important to
look at the causes of action set forth in plaintiffs' complaint. (R. at 25). Examination of
the complaint demonstrates that the causes of action are limited to breach of contract, and
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Examination of the causes of action is
important as much for what was not pled as for what was before the trial court. There
were no claims for conspiracy or fraud, or any other doctrine that would give the trial
court the opportunity to go outside the contract. The trial in this case was limited to
considering interpretation and enforcement of a contract, and is nothing more or less than
that. The pleadings are important because despite the lack of any wrongdoing or attempt
at deceit, the court has lumped parties and non-parties together and has seemingly
construed relationships between them that are outside the contract, and outside any
findings or conclusions.
13

There are a number of facts that are not contested by the defendants. There is no
conflict between the parties on the fact that plaintiffs and defendants executed a listing
agreement. (Trial exhibit 3, addendum 1). There is no dispute that while the listing
agreement was in place, plaintiffs obtained a lease between defendants and UVSC, and
were paid a commission. (R. 506 p. 12-14). Where the dispute begins is over the
conclusion that defendants owe a second commission to plaintiffs based on the eventual
sale of the property to Alpine School District, and the school district lease to MATC.
The trial court announced its decision that a second commission was owing by
using the following language in its ruling: "Although the Property was sold to Alpine
before Alpine sold it to MATC, the intermittent sale in my view does not alter the fact
that the tenant purchased the Property." (R. at 331). This brings the first question for
consideration by this court to the forefront. Does an installment sale between Alpine
School District and MATC somehow trigger payment of a second commission by
Defendants?
The court reached the conclusion that a commission was owing on the basis that:
"Since the tenant's purchase occurred during the term of the lease, the provision of the
Modified Listing Agreement regarding the sale to a tenant is triggered by the purchase."
There are at least two basic problems with this conclusion. The first problem is that the
isolated statement from the agreement relied on by the court does not reflect the intent of
the parties, nor the plain language of the Modified Listing Agreement. The second
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problem with this conclusion is that it utterly ignores the fact that defendants were not
parties to, and had no control of the sale between Alpine School District and MATC.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT REACHED AN INCORRECT LEGAL
CONCLUSION ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE TERM "SOLD TO A
TENANT" BY IGNORING THE PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT AND ITS
TERMS AS A WHOLE.
As indicated above, in determining that Yorks owed a second commission, the
court relied on a single sentence from the Modified Listing Agreement. The sentence
states that: "Since the tenant's purchase occurred during the term of the lease, the
provision of the Modified Listing Agreement regarding the sale to a tenant is triggered by
the purchase." (R. at 331). Based on this statement, it appears that the court took a very
narrow look at a single sentence from the Modified Listing Agreement and applied that
sentence without harmonizing the sentence with the rest of the listing agreement. The
trial court's failing to harmonize the agreement constitutes error. Wagner v. Clifton 2002
UT 109, 62 P.3d 440, 460 Utah Adv. Rep. 42; 2002 Utah LEXIS 172. "It is axiomatic
that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its
terms, which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." L.D.S. Hospital v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co. 765 P.2d 857, 858; 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 16; 1988 Utah LEXIS 108.
Analysis of the listing agreement demonstrates that the purpose of the agreement is not to
simply provide a commission to plaintiffs under any and all circumstances, but to provide
a commission if and when defendants sell the property to a "tenant" during the term of
the lease. It is appropriate for this court to review this interpretation of the contract since
when contract interpretation is a matter of law, appellate courts review for correctness
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giving no deference to the trial court. Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104, 161 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22; 1991 Utah LEXIS 41. See also Gillmor v. Macey 2005 UT App 351, 121
P.3d 57, 533 Utah Adv. Rep. 13; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 349.
These principles of contract interpretation are set forth explicitly in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979), titled "Rules in Aid of Interpretation" which states:
(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all the circumstances, and if
the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.
(2) A writing is inteipreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same
transaction are interpreted together.
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested, (a) where language has a generally
prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning; (b)
technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used
in a transaction within their technical field.
(4) Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for
objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced
in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the
agreement.
(5) Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise
or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any
relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.
Examination of the contract using the applicable principles set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979) demonstrates that the court did not
properly interpret the contract in finding that an installment sale agreement between
Alpine School District and MATC entitled plaintiffs to a second commission.
The first principle set forth in section 202 above involves ascertaining the
principal purpose of the parties. The first line of the text indicates who those parties were.
The agreement states that: "This agreement is entered into by and between Tom Heal
Commercial Real Estate, Inc., (the "Company") and John York (the "Seller"). (See trial
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exhibit #3, addendum 1). Here the purpose of the agreement is to provide a mechanism
whereby defendants (Sellers), retain plaintiffs, (Company) to "Sell, Lease, or Exchange
certain real property owned by Seller, described as: Commercial Building at 759 East
Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah (the "Property), at the price and terms stated on the
attached property data information form, or at such other price and terms to which the
Seller may agree in writing;' (Trial exhibit 3 at paragraph 1). According to the
agreement Seller was to pay Company a 6% commission for success in selling or leasing
the property. Accordingly, when the property was leased to UVSC, the plaintiffs were
paid a 6% commission. (R. 506 p. 32:12-14).
In considering the meaning of the language in the contract, one of the key phrases
to be considered in determining the intent of the parties is "real property owned by
Seller". (Trial exhibit 3 at paragraph 1). Considering this language in light of the
decision of the trial court, it appears that instead of interpreting the agreement "in light of
all the circumstances", and giving great weight to the "purpose of the parties", the trial
court isolated the language contained in paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement and
Agency Disclosure. The court read the provision as providing a second commission
where there was a sale to a tenant "during the term of the lease or within 180 days of
expiration of the lease," without considering whether based on the intent of the agreement
the sale to a tenant had to be a sale by the "Seller."
That triggering of a second commission is based on the premise that "Seller" be
involved in the sales transaction can be seen in several places in the agreement. As
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indicated above, the "Company" is being given the right to Sell, Lease or Exchange
property "owned by Seller." (Trial Exhibit 3 paragraph 1, addendum 1). In the second
paragraph, Company is to find a party willing to "acquire" the property. The sale must be
"at the listing price, and at terms to which the Seller has agreed in writing." Later in the
second paragraph it indicates that the brokerage fee is due on the "date of closing of the
acquisition of the property."
The fourth paragraph of the agreement also contains language tending to
demonstrate that the circumstance contemplated by the agreement is a sale by the Seller.
The paragraph covers seller warranties and disclosures. In the paragraph, "Seller"
warrants that the party listed in the agreement as Seller represents "all of the record
owners of the property." (Trial Exhibit 3 at paragraph 4, addendum 1). The seller
warrants that it has "marketable title and established right to sell, lease, or exchange the
Property." Seller agrees to "execute the necessary documents of conveyance and to
prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the Property
to the agreed date of possession." Further, in paragraph 4 the Seller agrees to "execute
the necessary documents of conveyance and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents,
interest and other expenses affecting the Property to the agreed date of possession." The
seller also promises to "furnish the buyer at closing good and marketable title with a
policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price." (Trial exhibit 3 at
paragraph 4). Finally, as Sellers, the Yorks promised to "fully inform the Seller's Agent
regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property." (Trial exhibit 3 at
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paragraph 4, addendum 1). With respect to the installment sale that the court found to
have occurred between Alpine School District and MATC, there is no evidence in the
record that defendants performed any of the above obligations, as they sold the property
to Alpine School District, not to MATC.
The above language is important in interpreting the purpose of the listing
agreement because it demonstrates the basis and intent of the parties respecting the
Modified Listing Agreement. The promises made by Sellers in the above paragraphs of
the Modified Listing Agreement are exactly the kind of promises made when a seller
transfers property it owns to a buyer. They are not promises a seller would, or could
make with respect to a sale by the buyer to another party.
The second paragraph of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979) also
bears consideration in light of the language extracted from the Modified Listing
Agreement set forth above. That paragraph provides that: "A writing is to be interpreted
as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are to be interpreted
together." Clearly the trial court did not follow this principle of contract interpretation in
concluding that the sale from Alpine School District to MATC was a sale to a tenant
triggering a second commission. In examining the language from the Modified Listing
Agreement, it is clear that the entire document is based on the premise that "Seller" is the
party who holds and then sells the property. There is no reference to actions by third
parties.
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The third paragraph from Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979) set
forth above is also helpful in the case at bar. The paragraph provides that words are
interpreted using their generally prevailing meaning. Further, technical words are given
their technical meaning. Here it seems that the first critical word needing interpretation is
"Seller". In examining the term in the context of the Modified Listing Agreement, it is
clear that the word in effect has two meanings. On one level, according to a sentence
preceding paragraph 1 of the agreement John York is the "Seller." On a second level, the
term "Seller" has its ordinary meaning which according to Websters is "one that offers
for sale". Here, the defendants offered nothing for sale, nor sold anything to MATC.
The second word that seems to need some further interpretation is the word "sale".
The word comes up implicitly through the use of the word "sell" in the first paragraph of
the Modified Listing Agreement, (Trial Exhibit 3, Addendum 1), and directly in the
second paragraph where plaintiffs are given a second commission for a "sale" to a tenant.
The Supreme Court of Utah stated in 1945 that "the word 'sale' in the context of a real
estate broker's listing contract, which sometimes renders the owner liable for payment of
a commission, means "the conveyance of title to the purchaser for a valuable
consideration consisting of the purchase price, or the execution and delivery of a valid
and enforceable contract of sale whereby some estate in the land, legal or equitable,
passes to the purchaser." Lewis v. Dahl 108 Utah 48,161 P.2d 362, 1945 Utah LEXIS
143, 160 A.L.R. 1040. In Lewis, there was a valid listing contract, and owners had
allegedly made an oral agreement to sell their property to certain buyers during the listing
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term, but not a written one. The written agreement was completed after the term of the
listing agreement had expired. The broker won in the trial court, but the appeals court
reversed, because an oral agreement was not a "sale" within the terms of the listing
agreement.
In the case at bar, the contract states that York would be liable for a commission
in the event that the "property" is "sold to a tenant" during a certain term. Much like the
owners in Lewis, York did not make a written sale contract with MATC or UVSC.
Unlike the owners in Lewis, York did not even make an oral sale contract with MATC or
UVSC. York did not make a sale contract at all with MATC or UVSC, but with a
separate entity, Alpine School District, which the Trial Court concluded subsequently
sold the property to MATC. Clearly, if the Utah Supreme Court concluded that an oral
contract between owner and buyer during the term of a listing agreement is not a "sale,"
then no contract at all between owner and buyer during the term of a listing agreement is
not a "sale."
Because there was no series of transactions between the parties, the fourth
paragraph of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979) appears to have no
application. The final paragraph, paragraph 5 does have application. Section 5 indicates
that in interpreting contracts, the manifestations of intention of the parties to an
agreement are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any course of any
performance, course of dealing or usage of trade. Here, the listing agreement when
considered in its entirety demonstrates that its purpose is to assist defendants in selling
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their property, and that the provision regarding payment of the second commission is to
be harmonized with that purpose. Examining the document as a whole, it is evident that
commission payments are premised on the sale by the "Seller" of property he owns. The
provision regarding a second commission for sale to a tenant is consistent with the rest of
the agreement when interpreted in a way that requires that sale to have been made by
"Seller", not by some third party. The interpretation adopted by the trial court is at odds
with the balance of the agreement and is not consistent with the requirements of section
202.
In examining the purpose of the agreement, it is necessary to look at the words
used. The first line of the text sets forth the parties to the agreement. The agreement
states that: "This agreement is entered into by and between Tom Heal Commercial Real
Estate, Inc., (the "Company") and John York (the "Seller"). (See trial exhibit #3,
addendum 1). Giving the ordinary meaning to those words, the term "Seller" means John
York.
D.
SALE TO A TENANT BY YORKS IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO PAYMENT OF A SECOND COMMISSION.
In examining the Modified Listing Agreement in its entirety, it is clear that the
sale to a tenant that triggers a second commission, must be a sale by the defendants. In
effect, this requirement constitutes a condition precedent. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 224 (1979) defines conditions^ and states: "A condition is an event, not
certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under a contract becomes due."
22

In this case, the condition precedent is that the defendants are the party who
sells the property to the tenant. That this is the intent of the contract can be determined
by examination of the contract. As discussed above, the "Seller' under the contract is
John York. In the case at bar, the buyer from John York was the Alpine School District.
According to the court's findings the "tenant" was MATC. (R. 339 at paragraph 6).
Where the sale by the Yorks was to Alpine School District, and where it was Alpine
School District that was involved in the installment sale with the "tenant", there is a
failure of the condition precedent, which was that Yorks were the sellers.
In effect, the Trial Court was too narrow in its decision. In considering the sale of
the real property to Alpine School District, and the installment sale to MATC as a sale to
a tenant, the court has failed to consider the effect the sale to Alpine School District has
had on any relationship that may have existed between Defendants and MATC. Query
for example whether in the event of a breach of the agreement between Alpine School
District and MATC, Defendants could be sued for that breach also? Clearly as they are
not parties to the agreement, they could not be held liable for a breach of the contract
between Alpine and the MATC.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
REAL PROPERTY WAS "SOLD TO A TENANT55 BECAUSE THE SO-CALLED
"SALE55 TO TENANT MATC WAS BASED UPON AN INVALID AND
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.
The Trial Court's ruling in this case is predicated on the notion that MATC
purchased the subject property from Alpine School District in May 2004, thus triggering
payment of a second commission to Plaintiffs. Paradoxically, the Trial Court also ruled
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that "MATC was unable to purchase the Property at the time because it did not have the
right, independent of legislative action, to acquire real property," (R. 506 p. 87:14) which
suggests that any "purchase" by MATC at the time would have been invalid. It is
Defendant's position that the statutes governing MATC in May 2004 did not confer upon
MATC the right to enter into a lease-purchase agreement, thus making the lease-purchase
agreement void and unenforceable against defendants. The proper standard of review for
considering interpretation of a statute is set forth in Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT
103, 57 P.3d 1079, 459 Utah Adv. Rep. 19; 2002 Utah LEXIS 165. "The proper
interpretation of a statute is . . . a question of law, which appellate courts review for
correctness." Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, 459 Utah Adv. Rep.
19; 2002 Utah LEXIS 165.
A.
MATC LACKED STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO
THE LEASE-PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT
IN MAY 2004, AND THIS LACK OF AUTHORITY MADE THE LEASEPURCHASE AGREEMENT INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST
YORKS.
The validity of the lease-purchase agreement between Alpine School District and
MATC is central to the question of whether the lease-purchase agreement between
Alpine and MATC made in May 2004 was or was not a "sale" to MATC. Although
discussed in other contexts above, "The word 'sale' in a real estate broker's listing
contract" can mean one of two things, namely (1) "the conveyance of title to the
purchaser for a valuable consideration consisting of the purchase price" or (2) "the
execution and delivery of a valid and enforceable contract of sale whereby some estate in
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land, legal or equitable, passes to the buyer." Lewis v. Dahl 108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362,
1945 Utah LEXIS 143, 160 A.L.R. 1040 (emphasis added). Here, if MATCs leasepurchase agreement was a "sale," it could not qualify under the first prong, which
requires a "conveyance of title," because legal title remains in Alpine under the leasepurchase agreement. (MATC is still a tenant of Alpine School District, R. 506 p. 104:16). Rather, it must qualify, if at all, under the second prong, which requires (a) "a valid
and enforceable contract" (b) that passes "some estate in land, legal or equitable."
Because MATC is an entity created by statute, the inteipretation of the statutes that
govern MATC is crucial to the question of whether the contract is "valid and
enforceable."
MATC, like other statutorily created entities, may only do those things authorized
by the statutes that created it. In Weese v. Davis County, 834 P.2d 1,188 Utah Adv.
Rep.3; 1992 Utah LEXIS 46, the Utah Supreme Court held that a contract entered into by
a statutorily created entity (in this case a county) in excess of that entity's authority was
void. Specifically, it stated:
Any contract, express or implied, between plaintiffs and the county is
subject to the statutory and constitutional limitations on the county as a
governing body. The county only has those rights and powers granted it by
the Utah Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to
accomplish them, [citation]. Any act by the county in excess of this
authority or forbidden by the Utah Constitution is null and void as an ultra
vires act.
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Thus, where MATC lacked authority to enter a lease-purchase contract with Alpine, then
any such lease-purchase contract is void.~
The Trial Court's ruling is helpful in determining that MATC had no authority to
purchase the subject real property, because it states that "MATC was unable to purchase
the Property at the time because it did not have the right, independent of legislative
action, to acquire real property," (R. 506 p. 87:14). However, the Trial Court does not
elaborate on this point, and elaboration is necessary to understanding the extent of
MATC's authority in 2004.
In May 2004, MATC was a campus of the Utah College of Applied Technology.
UCA § 53B-2a-105(5) (2003). At that time, the Utah College of Applied Technology
was different than other higher education institutions because it was not a "body politic
and corporate" like the institutions listed in chapter 2 of title 53B, which had the right to
"take, hold, lease, sell, and convey real and personal property as the interest of the
institution requires." UCA § 53B-2-101 (2000) (Utah College of Applied Technology is
specifically not listed among the entities in this section). Instead, the Utah College of
Applied Technology was governed by Title 53B, chapter 2a of the Utah Code, entitled
"Utah College of Applied Technology." That chapter authorized the Utah College of
Applied Technology only to "enter into a lease with other higher education institutions,
public school districts, state agencies, or business and industry for [a specified term]."

2 More accurately, the contract is voidable by Alpine, because MATC would not be able to escape liability by
voiding its own contract, see Midwest Realty v. West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1975) ("the city cannot escape
payment by taking advantage of its own errors"). In any event, MATC could not enforce the agreement against
Alpine.
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UCA §53B-2a-l 13(1) (2000).
The Utah College of Applied Technology became a "body politic and corporate"
in 2005 by chapter 227 of the general legislative session (House Bill 86 as enrolled),
entitled "Utah College of Applied Technology Amendments." Although the Trial
Court's ruling is silent as to this bill, it was argued at trial that the existence of this bill
shows that this bill was not passed until after MATC entered into the lease-purchase
agreement, and MATC did not have authority to enter into the lease-purchase agreement
in May 2004. (R. 506 p. 173:14-24). This bill, among other things, "establishes the Utah
College of Applied Technology as a body politic and corporate" and "authorizes
campuses [of the Utah Applied Technology College] to enter into lease-purchase
agreements, subject to certain approvals." When section that allowed the Utah College of
Applied Technology to enter into a lease with other higher education institutions, UCA §
53B-2a-l 13(1) (2000), was amended; and the following subsection was added:
(2) (a) In accordance with Subsection 53B-2a-l 12(2), a college campus may enter
into a lease-purchase agreement if:
(i) there is a long-term benefit to the state;
(ii) the project is included in both the campus and Utah College of Applied
Technology master plans;
(iii) the lease-purchase agreement includes language that allows termination of
the lease;
(iv) the lease-purchase agreement is approved by the campus board of directors
and the board of trustees; and
(v) the lease-purchase agreement is:
(A) reviewed by the Division of Facilities Construction and Management;
(B) reviewed by the State Building Board; and
(C) approved by the Legislature.
(b) An approval under Subsection (2)(a) shall include a recognition of:
(i) all parties, dates, and elements of the agreement;
(ii) the equity or collateral component that creates the benefit; and
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(iii) the options dealing with the sale and division of equity.
The fact that this subsection was added, together with the provision that states that this
chapter "authorizes" the Utah College of Applied Technology to enter into leasepurchase agreements emphasizes the point that the Utah College of Applied Technology
was not able to enter into lease-purchase agreements before the 2005 general legislative
session and was able to do so afterwards.
B.
ALTHOUGH THE LEGISLATURE ARGUABLY RATIFIED THE
LEASE-PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MATC AND ALPINE SCHOOL
DISTRICT, SUCH SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION SHOULD NOT BROADEN
DEFENDANTS5 LIABILITY UNDER THE MODIFIED LISTING AGREEMENT.
It might be argued that chapter 225 of the 2005 general legislative session ratifies
the lease-purchase agreement entered into by MATC, and that the defendants should
therefore pay a second commission to plaintiffs. See Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River
Water-Works & Irrigation Co., 18 Utah 279, 55 P. 385, 1898 Utah LEXIS 124 (a city's
contract that initially was ultra vires and void was ratified by subsequent legislative
action), see Zion 's First National Bank Corp. v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 92
Utah Adv. Rep. 34; 1988 Utah LEXIS 97 (ratification of an agent's unauthorized act
relates back to the time the unauthorized act occurred). However, the foregoing cases can
and should be distinguished from the present case. Those cases dealt solely with the
relationship between the parties, including a contract that was later ratified (analogously
in this case, Alpine School District and MATC). Defendant does not contest the notion
that the legislature's ratification may have ultimately made the lease-purchase agreement
enforceable by MATC against Alpine School District. The case at hand deals with an
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entirely different question, namely, a term in the Modified Listing Agreement that makes
the defendants liable to plaintiff realtors for a commission on the condition that the
property is "sold to a tenant" within a specified time. It is defendant's position that the
subsequent ratification by the legislature of the initially void installment sale from Alpine
School District to MATC should not expand defendants' liability.
"A court is not at liberty to disregard the language chosen by the parties and
broaden the liability in favor of one party at the expense of the other." Riche v. Jenkins,
641 P.2d 148, 150; 1982 Utah LEXIS 881. To require defendants to pay a commission
based on MATC's ultra vires and void lease-purchase agreement with Alpine School
District would constitute a miscarriage of justice. Defendants were aware that MATC
wished to but was unable to buy the property, (R. 338 paragraphs 12-14, R. 506 p. 137:212) and all parties were charged with knowledge of the law, and the law in effect at the
time did not authorize MATC to purchase the subject property. Alpine School District
was willing and able to purchase the subject property and did so; whatever side deals
Alpine School District made with MATC had nothing to do with defendants, especially
when the transaction between the entities was ultra vires and void.3

3 At trial, John York was asked: Did you have any involvement with the financing or other issues that took place
between a, Alpine School District or UVSC or MATC? A: No I didn't. Q: And why is that? A: Because it was their
building. It was none of my business what they did with it after they bought it. Q: Was it a cash sale? A: Yes. (R.
506 p. 142:1-9).
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C.
DEFENDANT DOES NOT OWE A COMMISSION UNDER THE
MODIFIED LISTING AGREEMENT BECAUSE MATC WAS NOT A "READY,
WILLING, AND ABLE" BUYER WITHIN 180 DAYS OF THE EXPIRATION OF
ITS LEASE.
Defendants should not have been required to pay a second commission to
Plaintiffs because the tenant, MATC, was not "able" to buy the property, hence plaintiffs
did not procure a "ready, willing, and able" buyer. The general rule in real estate
contracts is: "Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the right to a commission
on the performance of the buyer, the general rule accepted in Utah is that a broker has
earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer who is ready, willing and able and
who is accepted by the seller." Bushnell Real Estate v. Nielsen, 672 P.2d 746, 1983 Utah
LEXIS 1195 (emphasis added).4 In Bushnell, a buyer was procured who was "ready,
willing, and able," but subsequently refused to perform at closing. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the realtor and ordered the seller to pay the realtor a
commission, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding further that "[t]he broker is
not an insurer of the subsequent performance of the contract and is not deprived of his
right to a commission by the failure or refusal of the buyer to perform." Here, unlike in
Bushnell, the tenant could not effectively buy the property in question because the tenant
was without legal capacity to do so, and for the tenant to do so would have been a void
and ultra vires act.

4 It is noted that the language "accepted by the seller" could be emphasized here, because the "seller," which is
defined in the Modified Listing Agreement as the defendants, had nothing to do with the transaction between Alpine
School District and MATC, and MATC therefore could not have been "accepted by the seller."
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The "ready, willing, and able" rule can be modified by contract. Such was the
case in Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94
P.3d 292, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 33; 2004 Utah LEXIS 122, where a listing contract
provided that a commission was due "If. . . [the realtor] procures, or presents an offer to
purchase said property from [a buyer named in the contract], at the price and upon the
terms and conditions set forth herein, or, at any other price or upon any other terms or
conditions acceptable to [the seller]." The offer was procured and presented, but the
buyer was not able to obtain financing. The seller argued that the "ready, willing, and
able" rule was not satisfied because the buyer was not "able" to purchase the property;
the court held, however, that the rule had been modified by the contract clause providing
for a commission if the seller "presents an offer to purchase" the property from the
specific buyer.
In this case, in contrast to Fairbourn, although it may be that the "ready, willing,
and able" rule was modified by the clause stating that a commission is due if the property
is "sold to a tenant" during a specified period of time, the modification only serves to
strengthen the rule by adding that the buyer need not only be "ready, willing, and able,"
but that in addition, the property must actually be "sold"5 within 180 days of the
expiration of the lease.

5 It should be noted that in Fairbourn, the seller also argued that a certain clause in the contract, stating that the
commission was "due and payable at closing*' created a condition precedent that closing must actually occur in order
for a commission to be due. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that to assign that meaning would
render meaningless the clause that the seller agrees to pay a commission in the event that an offer was presented.
Here, however, in the case at bar, the term "sold" takes the leap that the contract in Fairbourn did not take, and
creates a requirement that the sale actually be consummated.
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Even assuming arguendo that the defendants should be liable for a commission
because MATC's void and ultra vires transaction was ultimately ratified by the
legislature, it is noteworthy that MATC did not become "able" to buy the property until .
the 2005 general legislative session, more than 180 days after the expiration of its lease
with the defendants. The lease agreement between MATC and the defendants terminated
when defendants sold the subject property to Alpine School District, due to the following
tenn in the lease (See trial exhibit 16, addendum 2):
Transfer of Landlord's Interest. In the event of a sale or conveyance by Landlord
of Landlord's interest in the Premises other than a transfer for security purposes
only, Landlord shall be relieved from and after the date specified in any such
notice of trawler (sic) of all obligations and liabilities to Tenant which accrue after
such sale or conveyance on the part of Landlord, provided that any funds in the
possession of Landlord at the time of transfer in which Tenant has an interest shall
be delivered to the successor Landlord. This Lease shall not be affected by any
such sale or transfer and Tenant shall attorn to the purchaser or other transferee
provided that all of Landlords obligations accruing hereunder from and after such
sale or transfer are assumed in writing by such purchaser or transferee.
Thus, MATC was not a "ready, willing, and able" buyer of the property in May 2005
when the lease terminated or within 180 days of May 2005, and hence a commission is
not due.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and argument, defendants move this court to reverse
the trial court's ruling and find that the subject real property was in fact not "sold to a
tenant" within the meaning of the parties' real estate listing agreement, and that therefore
a second commission is not owing from defendants to plaintiffs, and to direct the trial
court to enter judgment for the defendants, and award them their costs and attorneys fees
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at the trial level and on appeal based on the provisions of the "Modified Listing
Agreement.
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ADDENDUM "1"

LISTING AGREEMENT.& AGENCY DISCLOSURE
This is a Legally Binding Agreement, Read Carefully Before Signing
Phis Agree.!** , entered into b, and between Ton, Heal Commercial Rca. Estate. >nc. (thc "Company") and
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_ <«* "Seller").
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described as: j ^ L ^ ^ r i l M fit ).l PlMfi r>T 1 ^ EftCT
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"Property"), at the price and terms stated on the attached properly data information
a * " ' ^ ' U «6rees to use rcasonublp efforts tofind..buyer or tenantforthe Property.
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^•,-,-n it i • fi„. i icimn Vi-rind the ConiDaiiv the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else loonies a party who is ready,
I BROKERAGE FEE. If, ^ m ^ ^ ^ ; ^ ^ ^ ^ K l (hcP operly, or any par. thereof, at the listing price and terms to which IhcSeliermny agree
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Sec. on 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokers fee on such acquisition to another brokerage

^ n l t ^ ^
, Qirr TTOWARRANTIES/DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants to the Company that the individual(s) entity listed above as the "Seller"representall of the record
f:^ S n e t f K l c r w.mri that it has marketable title and established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property The Seller agrees to execute he
owners of the Property The Seilei » • " « » «
insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the Property lo the agreed date of possession. I he
accessary documents of conveyance andi to P ' ^ * ™ ^ "t™™ ,„ , i c y o f d U e hlsUrance in the amount of the purchase price. In the event the acquisition
Seller agrees to furmsh he u y ^ a e t a * go J " f « f J J * ^ , ^ J ^ J l 0 w l e t 0 t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . The Selier agrees to fully Mbtngfte ^ r / s Agent
includes persona propcUy. I,e Selle ag e t o s g ^ «
Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign ^Seller's

In! the l o c a S U ^ lines; or (iii) any injuries resulting from any unsafe condmons w.lmn the Property.
„ „ m l l i n , n w , K m iTiTnoTU7ATI0N OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. By signing this Listing Agreement, the Seller agrees that the Seller's Agent-and tlie •
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^ e InfloiLe Sale involves limited agency, the Seller agrees lhat Seller's Agent and the Principal B^lcer are
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r X d t S t ? : 2 S S 7 « I p l l S ^ n d i ^ T i l ^ o p e r t y . or (iii) mis listing Agreement, the Seller's Agent and the Company STRONGLY
^.COMMEND THATTHB,SPLLEROriTAlN SUCH INDEPENDENT ADVICE.
„„ ,
. „ „ i„„m-„fnF»nBftnme« in imv matter arisinc out of this Listing Agreement, the Seller shall pay all costs and attorney fees, whether
7. ATTORNEY FEES. In case oi .heemploymcMoan au> ne n_«ny mrtto a ™»B
» ^
employment of the Company under
the matter is resolved throug ^ " " ^ r t S o s t h Se if gre^"toin n S
Compan^nd the Seller's Agentfron, all costs and attorney fees incurred by
^ ^ • * ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ S n ^
actio,, An/commissions due under the terms of this agreement that are not paid within five
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8 MTJl TIPLF LIST1NC SKRVICE. The Company is aut),ori7.ed and instructed to offer this Properly through the Wasatch IMO.H Regional Multiple Listing Service.
The Company is' further authorized to disclose after dosing thefinalterms and sales price of the Property.
.9. KEY AND KEY BOX. The Company B l S , D IS NOT authorized to have a key lo the Property. The Company Q IS, %JS NOT authorized to have a keybox
installed on the Properly.
10. SIGNAGE. The Company is authorized to place an appropriate sign on the Property.
ii ATTAPHMFNT The provisions of the attached MLS property dat* information form are incorporated by this reference. In order to complete the property data

&J^^i&?£^

p™idc««se,lcr wMh * "Westimnt0 ot'"1C sqw,re f00tagc ofthc Prep* -1-' As an M"mRle' '"c squari:
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, . r., ™-«-r R*nMT?v mrpnsiTS As Dart of an offer to purchase thc Property, a potential buyer will typically deliver an Earnest. Money Deposit to the brokerage

•whuJ^!^
k/r™™ Twrwif delivered to the Company by a potential buyer.

14. FACSIMILE (FAX) D O C U M E N T . Facsimile transmission of a signed copy of this Listing Agreement, and retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission,
shall be the same as delivery of an original. If this transaction involves multiple owners this Listing Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
15. E N T I R E A G R E E M E N T . This Listing Agreement, including the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure statement, and the attached MLS property data information
form, contains the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject matter of this Listing Agreement. This Listing Agreement may not be modified or amended
except in writing signed by the parties thereto.
T H E UNDERSIGNED Seller does hereby agree to the terms of this Listing Agreement.

g-zg-rfi

^LTOJj.
SELLER

Date
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SELLER

Date

THIS LISTJN6, AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance by the Company as evidence by its signature below. A C C E P T E D by the Company

m
(Authorized Sellers Agent)

f-ig-df
Date

___&_
(Principal Broken

^

^

Date

AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
AGENCY RELATIONS. The following is a brief but very important explanation regarding the nature of agency relationships between the Seller, the Buyer, the Company and the veal estate
agents involved.
1. Principal or Branch Broker. Every real estate agent must nftilialc with a real estate broker. The Broker is referred to as a Principal Broker or aBranch Broker (if the brokerage has a branch
office). The broker is responsible for operation of the brokerage and for the professional conduct of all agents.
2. Right of Agents to Represent Seller and/or Buyer. An agent may represent, through the brokerage, a seller who wants to sell property or a buyer who wants to buy property. On occasion,
an agent will represent both seller and buyer in the same transaction. V/hcn an agent represents a setter, the agent is a "Seller's Agent", when representing a buyer, the agent is a "Buyer's Agent' \
and when representing both seller and buyer, the agent is a "Limited Agent".
3. Rcq uireinent of Written Agreement. To represent a seller, a buyer, or both as a Limited Agent, a written agreement is required. Except as provided below, the Principal/Branch Broker also
represents whoever the agent represents; and regardless of whom the agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to all parties to the transaction.
4. Seller's Agent. A Seller's Agent works to assist the seller in locating a buyer and in renegotiating a transaction suitable to the seller's specific needs. A Seller's Agent has fiduciary duties
to the seller which include loyalty, full disclosure, confidentiality, diligence, obedience, reasonable care, and holding safe monies entrusted to the agent
5. Buyer's Agent. A Buyer's Agent works to assist the buyer in locating and negotiating the acquisition of a property suitable to that buyer's specific needs. A Buyer's Agent has the same
fiduciary duties to Die buyer that the Seller's Agent has to the Seller.
6. Limited Agent. A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer in the same transaction and works to assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable transactions. A Limited Agent has fiduciary
duties to both seller and buyer. However, those duties are "limited" because the agent cannot provide to both parties undivided loyalty and full disclosure of all information known o the agent.
For this reason, a Limited Agent must remain neutral in the representation of a seller and buyer, and may not disclose to either party information likely to weaken the bargaining position of the
oilier, such as, the highest price 1he buyer will pay or the lowest price the seller will accept A Limited Agent must, however, disclose to both parties material information known to the Limited
Agent regarding a defect in 1he Property and/or the ability of each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations.
7. In-House Sale. If the buyer for the seller's Property is also represented by an agent in the Company, that transaction is commouly referred to as on "In-House Sale". Most In-House Sales
•mvolvwttmi\ediv^awy-tusca«se,-«ellcr and-buycr-arc-represented-by one or- -more-agents- in the Company.- -In- houso Sflleo-can occur in nny-of tho ff>IUrvviqg.\vaya.—•
>
7.1 In-House Sale/One Agent. In (his.situation there is only one agent in the Company involved in the transaction-that agent represents both Seller and.Buycr. Therefore, the Seller's
Agent and the Principal Branch Broker are required to: (i) act ns Limited Agents; and (ii) inform the Seller regarding the limited agency when a buyer, who is also represented by the Seller's Agent,
first expresses an interest in the Property.
7.2 In-House Sale/Two Agents. In this situation there arc two different agents in the Company involved in the transaction. One represents the Setter, one represents the Buyer, and
the Principal/Branch Broker ucts as a Limited Agent In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency of the Principal/Branch Broker when
a buyer represented by another agent in the company, first expresses an interest in the Properly.
7.3 In-House Sale/All Agents. In this situation all agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch Broker, represent both die Seller and the Buyer as Limited Agents. In such
a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the Limited Agents. In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency
when a buyer also represented by an agent In the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property.
8. Conflicts With The In-House Sale. There are conflicts associated with an Ln-Uouse Sale; for example, agents affiliated with the Company discuss with each other the needs of their respective
buvers or setters. Such discussions could inadvertently compromise the confidentiality of information provided to those agents. For that reason, the Company has policies designed to protect
the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access to confidential client and transactions files.
9. Dulics of Buyer am! Setter. The above dulics of the real estate agcnt(s) in a real csmtc transaction do not relieve a SeJIer or Buyer from the responsibility to exercise good business judgement
in protecting their rtspeclive interests. Real Estate agents arc licensed to market renl estate. Real estate agents are not trained or licensed to provide thei'Buyer or the Seller with legal or tax advice,
or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the property, the real estate agent(s) below strongly recommend that the Buyer and the Seller obtain such independent professional
advice.

X^f

'Seller's initials

ADDENDUM "2"

LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTIOiN TO PURCHASE
This Lease Agreement With Option to Purchase (the "Agreement") is made and entered
into between the Board of Education of Alpine School District, a body corporate, hereinafter
called ;iLESSOR", and Mountainland Applied Technology College: A Utah College of Applied
Technology Campus, a public institution of higher education in the State of Utah, hereinafter
called "LESSEE".
RECITALS
1. Mountainland Applied Technology College and its predecessor in interest has
provided its educational programs in a leased facility in American Fork, Utah known as the
fonner ACE Hardware Building. The Alpine School District has recently acquired ownership of
this building and surrounding property.
2. Alpine School District desires have Mountainland Applied Technology College
continue to provide its educational programs to students of the Alpine School District and other
students at this American Fork location on a long-term basis and therefore desires to lease the
building and surrounding property to Mountainland Applied Technology College together with
providing Mountainland Applied Technology College with an option to purchase the building
and surrounding property.
3. Mountainland Applied Technology College desires to continue to provide its
educational programs at this American Fork location, to lease the building and surrounding
property, and to have an option to purchase the building and property at some time in the future.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties, for valid consideration herein acknowledged and received,
mutually agree to the following:
SECTION 1. LEASED PREMISES
1.1 LESSOR does hereby lease and rent unto LESSEE, and LESSEE does hereby take as
tenant under LESSOR, that certain real property located in Utah County, State of Utah, and more
particularly described as approximately 3.79 acres together with all buildings and other
improvements now or hereafter located thereon and affixed thereto (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the "Buildings"), located at 759 East Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah 84003
(hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), and any and all privileges,.easements, and
appurtenances belonging thereto or granted herein. The Property and the Buildings are
hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Premises". A legal description of the Property and a
map of the Premises are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A" to this
Agreement.
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SECTION 2. TERM OF LEASE
2,1 The term of the lease of the Premises shall be for a period of twelve (12) years and
seven (7) months, which term shall commence July 1, 2004 and shall expire January 31, 2017
unless sooner terminated pursuant to the terms, covenants, and conditions of this Agreement.
SECTION 3.

CONSIDERATION

3.1 As monthly rent for the Premises, LESSEE shall pay to LESSOR, on the first day of
each and every calendar month during the term of this Agreement, an amount equal to the
amount set forth in accordance with the following schedule:
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Year 11
Year 12
Year 13
Final Payment

July 1,2004 to June 30, 2005
July 1, 2005 to June 30,2006
July 1,2006 to June 30,2007
July 1,2007 to June 30, 2008
July 1,2008 to June 30, 2009
July 1,2009 to June 30, 2010
July 1,2010 to June 30,2011
July 1,2011 to June 30,2012
July 1,2012 to June 30,2013
July 1,2013 to June 30,2014
July 1,2014 to June 30,2015
July 1,2015 to June 30, 2016
July 1,2016 to December 31, 2016
Jan 31,2007.

$20,416.67 per month
$21,233.33 per month
$22,082.67 per month
$22,965.97 per month
$23,884.61 per month
$24,840.00 per month
$25,833.60 per month
$26,866.94 per month
$27,941.62 per month
$29,059.28 per month
$30,221.65 per month
$31,430.52 per month
$32,687.74 per month
$13,913.54

3.2 All rental payments shall be made payable and delivered to LESSOR at the
following address:
Alpine School District
575 North 100 East
American Fork UT 84003
SECTION 4. OPTION TO PURCHASE
4.1 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, LESSEE shall have the
right to purchase the Premises, all in accordance with the terms and conditions contained herein.
LESSOR hereby grants to LESSEE the exclusive right and option to purchase the Premises, as
more specifically described and set forth in Exhibit A. LESSEE may exercise its exclusive right
and option to purchase the Premises at any time during the term of this Agreement.
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4.2 The purchase price of the Premises has been fully negotiated by the parties, and shall
be in accordance with the Purchase Price Schedule set forth and incorporated herein by this
reference as Exhibit B.
4.3 To exercise the option, LESSEE shall give LESSOR sixty (60) days written notice of
its intention to purchase the Premises, specifying the date on which the Premises are to be
purchased (the "Closing Date"). Upon exercise of the said option, the parties shall enter into a
Purchase and Sale Agreement containing the customary provision for a sale of commercial real
estate in Utah County, Utah. On the Closing Date, LESSEE shall provide LESSOR with a
payment of the purchase price and LESSOR shall deliver to LESSEE the Premises free and clear
of any and all liens and encumbrances, together with a Warranty Deed conveying good and
marketable title, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.
4.4 Without limitation to any other termination provisions of this Agreement, in the
event LESSEE exercises its option to purchase the Premises, this Agreement shall terminate
upon the closing of all terms and conditions of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, or upon the
transfer of title of the Premises to LESSEE.
4.5 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, upon expiration of the
term of this Agreement, and provided that all monthly rental payments set forth herein have been
paid, LESSEE shall be deemed to have purchased the Premises and shall be vested with all rights
and title to the Premises. LESSOR agrees that upon the occurrence of the events as provided in
this Section 4.5, LESSOR shall deliver to LESSEE the documents specified in Section 4.3, and
shall comply with the provisions of this Section 4, as if LESSEE had exercised its option, in
writing, to purchase the Premises.
SECTION 5. REPRESENTATIONS
5.1 LESSOR warrants and represents that it is the lawful owner of the Premises and that
it has the right to lease the same as herein provided.
5.2 LESSOR warrants and represents that LESSEE shall peaceably and quietly hold and
enjoy the full possession and use of the Premises during the term of this Agreement.
5.3 LESSOR warrants and represents that it has no intention of selling the Premises to
any third parties during the term of the Agreement. However, in the event a sale of the Premises
is contemplated by LESSOR, LESSOR shall notify LESSEE as soon as possible, in writing, of its
intent to sell the Premises and shall make any acceptance or offer of the sale of the Premises
contingent upon LESSEE'S exclusive right.to exercise its option to purchase the Premises, either
before or after the contemplated sale of the Premises to some third party.
5.4 LESSEE has had sufficient opportunity to inspect the real property and structures
associated with this lease. LESSEE enters into this agreement accepting the property in an "as
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isn condition and agrees that it will be fully lesponsible to remediate any pre-existing defects
with the pioperty or btiuctures irrespective of whether the defects are known to the parties at the
time this agreement is executed
SECTION 6 IMPROVEMENTS
6 1 The parties acknowledge that the Buildings will need to be improved and remodeled
in oider for LESSEE to adequately meet the anticipated growth in programs and students served
by LESSEE Theiefore, LESSOR agrees to improve and remodel the Buildings, with such work
to commence at anytime after approval of this agieement, but no later than December 31, 2004
Plans and specifications for improvements and remodeling shall be agreed on by both the
LESSEE and LESSOR prior to commencing any work LESSEE shall provide LESSOR with a
tenant improvement payment m the amount of $295,000 by M y 1, 2004, or earlier, if
improvement and remodeling should commence befoie July 1, 2004 LESSOR agrees to fund
impiovements and remodeling to a taiget cost of $600,000, which is built into the payment
schedule in Section 3 1 If, at the conclusion of the improvement and lemodelmg work,
LESSOR has expended an amount other than $600,000, LESSOR and LESSEE shall recalculate
the amount of each monthly payment over the term of this agreement to reflect the actual amount
expended for such improvements
LESSOR will recalculate the payment schedule m Section 3 1 to reflect the actual amount
expended LESSOR and LESSEE shall agree to any changes in the payment schedule, prioi to an
updated payment schedule replacing Section 3 1 and becoming an exhibit to this agreement
6 2 LESSOR agrees that in order to effectuate the purposes of this Agreement, it will
make, execute, acknowledge and transmit any contracts, purchase oiders, receipts, writings and
instructions with any other person, firm, or corporations, and m geneial do all things which may
be lequired or proper, all for the acquisition, construction, and improvement of the Piernises.
6 3 LESSOR and LESSEE shall jointly review and inspect all aspects of the
construction, remodel and improvements and shall compile a list of those items to be corrected,
finished, oi completed LESSOR shall be deemed to have substantially performed all of such
work when the same has been entirely completed
6 4 In the event all items of said improvements, lemodelmg, and lepairs are not
completed within sixty (60) days of March 31, 2005, to the complete satisfaction of LESSEE,
LESSEE shall have the right to secure services to complete said unprovements remodelmg, and
repairs and to deduct the cost thereof from any rental payment due, except however, if such
delays aie caused by an action or inaction of LESSEE, in which case a time extension of said
sixty (60) days will be gianted for such additional time warranted by LESSEE'S action or
inaction
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SECTION 7. UTILITIES
7.1 LESSEE agrees to pay for the following utilities furnished to the Premises during
the term hereof, to-wit: electricity, heat, water, sewer, air conditioning, snow removal and office
building standard cleaning services.
SECTION 8. INSURANCE
8.1 LESSEE further agrees to maintain property and liability insurance on the Premises
and to keep the Premises fully insured to protect the same from loss or damage by fire, vandalism
and malicious mischief at all times during the term of this Agreement. LESSEE'S hazard
insurance shall insure the interest of both LESSOR and LESSEE, as they may appear from time
to time in the Buildings and Property. LESSOR shall be named as an additional insured on all
such policies of insurance. All costs of such insurance shall be borne by the LESSEE. LESSEE
shall be responsible for damages to all personal property it may locate in the Premises.
SECTION 9. REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE
9.1 All repairs and maintenance of the Leased Premises shall be made by, and at the
sole cost and expense of, LESSEE. Without limitation, LESSEE shall be responsible for 1) all
roof and structural repairs, wind damage, and glass breakage; 2) providing full service repair and
maintenance of heating and air conditioning equipment; 3) all plumbing repairs or maintenance;
and 4) providing ground and parking lot maintenance. LESSEE agrees to provide such repairs
and maintenance that LESSEE deems to be necessary and reasonable, in a timely and efficient
manner, and to have adequate maintenance procedures in place during the term of this
Agreement.
SECTION 10. USE OF PREMISES
10.1 LESSEE shall use and occupy the Premises for educational purposes associated
with LESSEE'S duties as an applied technology college. LESSEE shall not at any time use or
occupy or permit the Premises to be used or occupied in any manner which would in any way
violate any certificate of occupancy issued for the building, and shall not use or permit the
Premises to be used or occupied in whole or in part in a manner which may violate the laws,
orders, ordinances, rules, regulations, or requirements of any department of federal or state
governments.
10.2 LESSEE agrees to permit LESSOR and any authorized representatives of
LESSOR to enter the Premises with twenty-four (24) hours prior notice to LESSEE to fulfill any
of LESSOR'S obligations under this Lease.
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SECTION 11. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF LEASED PREMISES
11.1 In the event that any of the Buildings or Property shall be damaged or destroyed
by fire or by any other means and are thereby made unusable for a period of more than thirty (30)
days, at any time during the term of this Agreement, LESSEE shall then have the option to
terminate this Agreement .per Section 17.
11.2 If any of the Buildings or the Property are partially destroyed or damaged by fire
or by any other means, yet can continued to be used by the LESSEE for its educational
programs, this Agreement shall continue in foil force and effect for the remainder of the term and
repairs shall be completed by LESSEE within ninety (90) days from the date of such destruction
or damage.
SECTION 12. LESSEE'S PERSONAL PROPERTY & FIXTURES
12.1 All personal property and fixtures placed in or upon the Premises by LESSEE shall
not become part of the Premises and LESSEE shall be privileged to remove the same at the
termination or expiration of the Agreement.
SECTION 13. TERMINATION & SURRENDER OF LEASED PREMISES
13.1 Except in the event of an exercise of its option to purchase or except in the event
of a purchase in accordance with Section 4.5 of this Agreement, LESSEE agrees to quit and
surrender peaceable possession of the Premises to LESSOR if this Agreement is terminated.
LESSEE agrees to leave the Premises in as good a state of repair and sanitary condition as when
received, reasonable wear and tear and damage by the elements or by fire excepted.
SECTION 14. DEFAULT
14.1 LESSOR shall be held in default if LESSOR fails to comply with any provision of
this Agreement for at least ten (10) business days after LESSOR receives written notice from
LESSEE specifying the nature of the non-compliance by LESSOR. Said ten (10) day period
shall be extended if more than ten (10) days is reasonably required for such cure and LESSOR
immediately, upon receipt of said written notice, commences or has commenced such cure and
thereafter diligently pmceeds to cure such default within thirty (30) days. In the event LESSOR
fails to timely cure such default, LESSEE may perform whatever LESSOR is obligated to do by
the provisions of this Agreement. LESSOR agrees that LESSEE shall not be liable for any
damages to LESSOR from such action, whether caused by negligence of LESSEE or otherwise.
14 .2 LESSEE shall be held in default if LESSEE fails to comply with any provision of
this Agreement for at least ten (10) business days after LESSEE receives written notice from
LESSOR specifying the nature of the non-compliance by LESSEE. Said ten (10) day period
shall be extended if more than ten (10) days is reasonably required for such cure and LESSEE
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immediately, upon receipt of said written notice, commences or has commenced such cure and
thereafter diligently proceeds to cure such default within thirty (30) days. In the event LESSEE
fails to timely cure such default, LESSOR may perform whatever LESSEE is obligated to do by
the provisions of this Agreement. LESSEE agrees that LESSOR shall not be liable for any
damages to LESSEE from such action, whether caused by negligence of LESSOR or otherwise.
SECTION 15. COSTS & ATTORNEY'S FEES
15.1 In case of default in carrying out the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the
party in default agrees to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of the other party in
. enforcing this Agreement. If a breach of contract is alleged by either party against the other
party, fifteen (15) days prior written notice of default shall be given to the other party before any
legal action is taken or in any other action or proceeding brought by either party against the other
pertaining to or arising out of this Agreement.
SECTION 16. MANNER OF GIVING NOTICE
16.1 Any notice to be given by either party to the other pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement or of any law, present or future, shall be in writing and delivered personally to the
party to whom notice is to be given, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to
the party for whom it is intended at the address stated below or such other address as it may have
designated in writing. Notice shall be deemed to have been duly given, if delivered personally,
upon receipt thereof, and if mailed, upon the third day after mailing thereof.
If to LESSEE:
If to LESSOR:
Campus President
Superintendent
Mountainland Applied Technology College
Alpine School District
987 South Geneva Road
575 North 100 East
Orem UT 84058
American Fork UT 84003

With a Copy .to:
Chair, Board of Directors
Mountainland Applied Technology College
987 South Geneva Road
Orem UT 84058

With a Copy to:
President, Board of Education
Alpine School District
575 North 100 East
American Fork UT 84003

SECTION 17. LESSEE'S OPTION TO TERMINATE LEASE
17.1 If, at any time during the term of this Agreement the State of Utah fails to fund die
continued operation of the educational programs provided by the LESSEE on the Premises, then
LESSEE shall have the right to terminate this Agreement upon one (1) year written notice to
LESSOR.
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17.2 The parties acknowledge that the growth of. and demand for, LESSEE'S
educational programs, is anticipated in large part due to the students of the Alpine School
District, and therefore LESSEE may be required to consider relocation of such educational
programs. The parties acknowledge that the obligations and responsibilities of the LESSEE
under this Agreement are similar to those more often expected of a lessor or owner of property.
Therefore, in the event LESSEE, in its sole reasonable discretion, determines the Premises are no
longer adequate for its needs, LESSEE may provide LESSOR with written notification of its
intent to terminate this Agi'eement (the ''Notice of Intention to Terminate"). In such an event,
the parties intention is to provide both the LESSOR and the LESSEE with an equitable
distribution of the net equity (or net loss) of the Premises, all in accordance with the following:
LESSOR has one or two options - either retain ownership of the Premise or sell the
Premises. Therefore, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice of Intention to
Terminate, LESSOR shall either:
1. Inform LESSEE that LESSOR will not sell the Premises, which, in turn, will
result in the following obligations:
a. The Agreement shall termmate on the first day of the month following
the 90th day after which LESSOR received the Notice of Intention to
Terminate. Until then, LESSEE will continue to be responsible for all
monthly rental payments and all other obligations due under this
Agreement.
b. LESSOR shall reimburse LESSEE a percentage portion (the
"Percentage Portion") of the fair market value of the Premises. The fair
market value of the Premises shall be determined by averaging the
appraisal price of two independent commercial appraisals, performed by
licensed, certified appraisers with familiarity and expertise in Utah
County, Utah. One of the appraisers shall be paid and chosen by the
LESSOR, and the other appraiser shall be paid and chosen by the
LESSEE. Both appraisals shall be completed within sixty (60) days of
LESSOR'S receipt of the Notice of Intention to Terminate. By mutual
agreement and consent of both the LESSOR and LESSEE, a single
appraisal may be used to determine the fair market value of the Premises.
c. LESSEE'S Percentage Portion, is a percentage that gradually escalates
during the term of this Agreement. The Percentage Portion has been fully
negotiated by the parties, and is set forth in Exhibit C, which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
d. LESSEE'S percentage portion of the fair market value of the Premises
shall be due and payable by LESSOR to LESSEE on the first day of the

FINAL: Aprill 3 : 2004
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month on which the Agreement is terminated as set forth in subsection a,
above.
OR
2. Inform LESSEE that LESSOR will sell the Premises., which, in turn will result
in the following obligations of the parties:
a. LESSOR shall immediately make all reasonable good faith efforts to
sell the Premises;
b. LESSEE shall remain a tenant with all of its rights and responsibilities
under the terms of this Agreement until the Premises are sold;
c. Upon the date of closing, LESSOR shall pay LESSEE a Percentage
Portion of the sale price set forth in Exhibit C, less reasonable costs and
expenses incurred by LESSOR in selling the Premises. The exact
Percentage Portion shall be as set forth in Exhibit C.
d. In the event that the sale price is less than the amount shown in Exhibit
B on the date of sale, LESSEE shall be responsible to pay the difference to
LESSOR through continuation of monthly lease payments at the time of
sale or a lump sum within one year of the sale.
SECTION 18. FORCE MAJEURE
18.1 If either party hereto shall be delayed or prevented from the performance of any act
required hereunder by reason of acts of God, strikes, lockouts, labor disputes, inability to procure
materials, restrictive governmental laws or regulations or other cause without fault and beyond
the control of the party obligated (financial inability excepted), performance of such act shall be
excused for the period of the delay and the period for the performance of any such act shall be
extended for a period equivalent to the period of such delay; provided, however, nothing in this
Section shall excuse LESSEE from the payment of any rentals required of LESSEE hereunder
except as expressly provided elsewhere in this Agreement.
SECTION 19. SEVERABILITY AND ASSIGNMENT
19.1 Each and every covenant and agreement contained in this Agreement is, and shall
be construed to be, a separate and independent covenant and agreement. If any term or provision
of this Agreement or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall to any extent be
invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement, or the application of such term or
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which is invalid or unenforceable,
shall not be affected.

FINAL: April 13,2004
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J 9.2 Neither LESSOR nor LESSEE shall assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate
or encumber this Agreement or the lease therein or any interest therein, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, without the prior, written approval of the other party, which approval may be
withheld due to the sole discretion of such party.
SECTION 20. MARGINAL CAPTIONS
20.1 The various headings and numbers herein and the grouping of the provisions of this
Agreement into separate sections and paragraphs are for the purpose of convenience only and
shall not be considered a part hereof
SECTION 21. GOVERNING LAW
21.1 This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah, without giving effect to the choice of law provisions hereof
SECTION 22. ENTIRE AGREEMENT
22.1 This Agreement and any Exhibits attached hereto, and forming a part hereof, set
forth all of the covenants, promises, agreements, conditions, and understandings between
LESSOR and LESSEE governing the Premises. There are no covenants, promises, agreements,
conditions and understandings, either oral or written, between them other than those herein set
forth. In the event the provisions of any Exhibit conflict with the provisions of this Agreement,
die Agreement shall govern. Except as herein provided, no subsequent alterations, amendments,
changes or additions to this Agreement shall be binding upon LESSOR or LESSEE unless and
until reduced to writing and signed by both parties. Submission of this instrument by LESSEE to
LESSOR for examination shall not bind LESSEE in any manner, and no lease, contract, option,
agreement to lease or otiier obligation of LESSEE shall arise until this instrument is signed by
LESSEE and delivered to LESSOR.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto sign and cause this Lease to be executed.

LESSEE

LESSOR

'LJU JJlUwJ^
Da.e:

Slrt/OY

Date: _ _ £ l ! ± U f f i _ _

Christie Hulet
Chair
Mountainland Applied Technology
College- Board of D i r e c t o r s
FINAL: April 13,2004

JoDee Sundberg.- P r e s i d e n t
Alpine School D i s t r i c t
Board of D i r e c t o r s
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EXHIBIT A
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

Commencing at a point which is 896.983 feet North and 1101.244 feet West of the East quarter
comer of Section 24, Township 5 South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; (basis of
bearing is the State Coordinate System); thence North 73°21'01" West 369.853 feet: thence North
0°26'01" East 473.459 feet; thence South 70°10'48" East 379.483 feet; thence South 0°47'38"
West 450.782 feet to the point of beginning.

EXHIBIT B
PURCHASE PRICE SCHEDULE
In the event the LESSEE exercises its right to purchase the Premises, all in accordance
with Sections 4 and 17 of the Agreement, the purchase/sale price shall be as set fonh as follows:

1

1

IF THE CLOSING DATE IS
ON ANY DAY DURING:

|

THEN THE PURCHASE PRICE
SHALL BE:

|

July 2004
August 2004
September 2004
October 2004
November 2004
December 2004
January 2005
February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005

$ 2,900,000
$ 2,890,420
$ 2,880,804
$2,871,152
$2,861,463
$2,851,739
$2,841,977
$2,832,180
$ 2,822,345
$2,812,474
$2,802,565
$ 2,792,620

J

July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005
January 2006
February 2006
March 2006
April 2006
May 2006
June 2006

$ 2,782,637
$2,771,799
$2,760,919
$ 2,749,999
$2,739,039
$2,728,037
$ 2,716,993
$ 2,705,909
$2,694,783
$2,683,615
$ 2,672,405
$2,661,153

J

July 2006
August 2006
September 2006
October 2006
November 2006
December 2006
January 2007
February 2007
March 2007
April 2007
May 2007
June 2007

$2,649,859
$ 2,637,672
$2,625,438
$2,613,160
$2,600,835
$ 2,588,463
$ 2,576,046
$2,563,582
$2,551,071
$2,538,513
$2,525,908
$2,513,256

J

EXHIBIT B
(Page 2)
PURCHASE PRICE SCHEDULE

j

THEN THE PURCHASE PRICE
SHALL BE:

IF THE CLOSING DATE IS
ON ANY DAY DURING:
July 2007 "
August 2007
September 2007
October 2007
November 2007
December 2007
January 2008
February 2008
March 2008
April 2008
May 2008
June 2008

1
!

$2,500,556
$ 2,486,924
$2,473,241
$2,459,506
$ 2,445,720
$2,431,882
$2,417,993
$2,404,051
$2,390,057
$2,376,010
$2,361,911
$ 2,347,759

July 2008
August 2008
September 2008
October 2008
November 2008
December 2008
January 2009
February 2009
March 2009
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009

$ 2,333,554
$2,318,375
$2,303,139
$ 2,287,846
$ 2,272,496
$2,257,088
$2,241,623
$ 2,226,099
$2,210,517
$2,194,877
$2,179,178
$2,163,420

July 2009
August 2009
September 2009
October 2009
November 2009
December 2009
January 2010
February 2010
March 2010
April 20010
May2010
June 2010

$2,147,604
$2,130,770
$2,113,874
$2,096,914
$2,079,891
$2,062,803
$ 2,045,652
$ 2,028,436
$2,011,156
$1,993,811
$ 1,976,401

$ 1,958,926

j

I

|

j

1

EXHIBIT B
(Page 3)
PURCHASE PRICE SCHEDULE

[

IF THE CLOSING DATE IS
ON ANT DAY DURING:

|

July 2010
August 2010
September 2010
October 2010
November 2010
December 2010
January 2011
February 2011
March 2011
April 2011
May20il
June 2011
July 2011
August 2011
September 2011
October 2011
November 2011
December 2011
January 2012
February 2012
March 2012
April 2012
May 2012
June 2012

J

July 2012
August 2012
September 2012
October 2012
November 2012
December 2012
January 2013
February 2013
March 2013
April 2013
May 2013
June 2013

THEN THE PURCHASE PRICE
SHALL BE:
$ 1,941,385
$ 1,922,783
$1,904,111
$ 1,885,369
$ 1,866,557
S 1,84^674
$ 1,828,721
$ 1,809,696
$ 1,790,600
$ 1,771,432
$ 1,752,193
$ 1,732,881
$ 1,713,497
$1,693,005
$ 1,672,437
$1,651,791
$1,631,067
$ 1,610,266
$1,589,387
$ 1,568,430
$ 1,547,394
$ 1,526,279
$ 1,505,085
$1,483,811

!

$ 1,462,458
$ 1,439,948
$ 1,417,353
$ 1,394,674
$ 1,371,910
$ 1,349,060
$ 1,326,125
S 1,303,103
$ 1,279,996
$1,256,801
$ 1,233,520

J

TU210,^52

j

j

EXHIBIT B
(Page 4)
PURCHASE PRICE SCHEDULE

1

THEN THE PURCHASE PRICE
SHALL BE:

IF THE CLOSING DATE IS
ON ANY DAY DURING
July 2013
August 2013
September 2013
October 2013
November 2013
Decembei 2013
January 2014
February 2014
March 2014
April 2014
May 2014
June 2014
July 2014
August 2014
September 2014
October 2014
November 2014
December 2014
January 2015
February 2015
March 2015
April 2015
May 2015
June 2015
July 2015
August 2015
September 2015
October 2015
November 2015
December 2015
January 2016
February 2016
Mai ch 2016
April 2016
May 2016
June 2016

!

!
i

!

$1,186,695
$1,162,031
$1,137,275
$1,112,426
$ 1,087,483
$ 1,062,447
$1,037,317
$ 1,012,093
$ 986,774
$ 961,361
$ 935,852
$ 910,247
$
$
$
$
$
S
S
$
$
$
$
$

j

1

|
|
I
1

j

884,546
857,585
830,522
803,358
776,092
748,724
721,253
693,679
666,001
638,220
610,335
582,345

]

$ 554,250
$ 524,839
$ 495,317
$ 465,685
$ 435,941
$ 406,086
S 376,119
$ 346,040
$ 315,848
$ 285,542
S 255,123
S 224,590

j

EXHIBIT B
(Page 5)

PURCHASE PRICE SCHEDULE
[

IF THE CLOSING DATE IS
ON ANY DAY DURING:
July 2016
August 2016
September 2016
October 2016
November 2016
December 2016

THEN THE PURCHASE PRICE
SHALL BE:
$ 193,943
S 161,921
J 129,779
$ 97,516
$ 65,132
$ 32,627

j

EXHIBIT C
LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE PORIlUfN
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE PREMISES
LESSEE'S Percentage Portion of the fair market value oi the Pi' nuses is set fmiti i
follows:

- "

'

DURING THE

1

1

MONTH OF:
July 2004
August 2004
September 2004
October 2004
November 2004
December 2004
January 2005
February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005
January 2006
February 2006
March 2006
April 2006
May 2006
June 2006

;

!

9 38%
9 67%
9 97%
1028%
10.58%
10.88%
11.19%
11.49%
11.80%
12.02%
12.42%
12.73%

)

13 04%
13.38%
13 77%
14 06° U

\

July 2006
August 2006
September 2006
October 2006
November 2006
December 2006
January 2007
February 2007
March 2007
April 2007
May 2007

June 2007

LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE
PORTION IS:

J

14.41%
14.75%
15 10%
15.44%
15 79%
15.95%
16.49%
16 84%o

j

17 19%
17.57%
17 96%
18 34%
18 72%
19.11%)
19 50%
19.89%
20.28%
20.67%.
21.07%,
2146%>

j

EXHIBIT C
(Page 2)
LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE PORTION
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE PREMISES
DURING THE

1

:

MONTH OF:
Juiy20O7
August 2007
September 2007
October 2007
November 2007
December 2007
January 2008
February 2008
March 2008
April 2008
May 2008
June 2008

LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE
PORTION IS:

|

21.86%
22.28%
22.71%
23.14%
23.57%
24.00%
24.44%
24.87%
25.31%
25.75%
26.19%
26.63%

j

July 2008
August 2008
September 2008
October 2008
November 2008
December 2008
January 2009
February 2009
March 2009
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009

27.08%
27.55%
28.03%
28.50%
28.98%
29.47%
29.95%
30 43%
30.92%
31.41%
31.90%
32.39%

j

July 2009
August 2009
September 2009
October 2009
November 2009
December 2009
January 2010
February 2010
March 2010
April 20010
May2010
June 2010

32.89%
33.41%
33.94%
34.47%
35 00%
35.54%
36 07%
36.61%
37.15%
37.69%
38.24%
38.78%

!

EXHIBIT C
(Page 3)
LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE PORTION
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE PREMISES

j

1

DURING THE
MONTH OF:

LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE
PORTION IS.

|

July 2010
August 2010
September 2010
October 2010
November 2010
December 2010
January 2011
February 2011
March 2011
April 2011
May 2011
June 2011

39.33%
39.91%
40.50%
41.08%
41.67%
42.26%
42.85%
43.45%
44.04%
44.64%
45.24%
45.85%

July 2011
August 2011
September 2011
October 2011
November 2011
December 2011
January 2012
February 2012
March 2012
April 2012
May 2012
June 2012

46.45%
47.09%
47.74%
48.38%
49 03%
49.68%
50.33%
50.99%
51.64%,
52.30%
52.97%
53.63%

July 2012
August 2012
September 2012
October 2012
November 2012
December 2012
January 2013
February 2013
March 2013
April 2013
May 2013
June 2013

54.30%
55.00%
55.71%
56.42%
57.13%
57.84%
58.56%
59.28%
60.00%
60 72%
61.45%

i

62.18%

j

j

1
I

j

1

EXHIBIT C
(Page 4)
LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE PORTION
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE PREMISES

J

DURING THE
MONTH OF:

;

LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE
PORTION IS:

J

July 2013
August 2013
September 2013
October 2013
November 2013
December 2013
January 2014
February 2014
March 2014
April 2014
May 2014
June 2014

62.92%
63.69%
64.46%
65.24%
66.02%
66.80%
67.58%
68.37%
69.16%
69.96%
70.75%
71.55%

J

J

July 2014
August 2014
September 2014
October 2014
November 2014
December 2014
January 2015
February 2015
March 2015
April 2015
May 2015
June 2015

72.36%
73.20%
74.05%
74.90%
75.75%
76.60%
77.46%
78.32%
79.19%
80.06%
80.93%
81.80%

J

July 2015
August 2015
September 2015
October 2015
November 2015
December 2015
January 2016
February 2016
March 2016
April 2016
May 2016
June 2016

82 68%
83 60%
84 52%
85 45%
86.38%
87,31%
88.25%
89.19%
90.13%
91.08%
92.03%
92.98%

J

J

EXHIBIT C
(Page 5)
LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE PORTION
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE PREMISES
DURING THE

1

MONTH OF:
July 2016
August 2016
September 2016
October 2016
November 2016
December 2016

LESSEE'S PERCENTAGE
PORTION IS:

\

93 94%
94.94%
95.94%
96.95%
97.96%

98 98%

1
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TOM HEAL COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE, etal.,

JASE NUMBER: 040402039

: ;>;.:i!i;:s,

vs.
RULING
JOHN YORK and LESA YORK,
M •: ' : > !I 'I H ; g

I i ial in i tl lis i i latte •i < as lie I :! : i i I Jo1 ei i lbei 3. 2005
advisement and considering the evidence presented to the court, the parties' arguments
and the relevant law, I am persuaded that plaintiffs are entitled to a commission on tlie
sale of defendants' property to the Alpine School District.
Findings of Fact
I lliiiiiiill Ill ill lln I'lillin1 \\\j] fiH/l li i i \u i in pup i in by ii 11«t"fHintlcraii r nil lllliii
evidence:
1.

Plaintit:..,

:. . oiiin.-ju.^. i^ai :.statw ,±nd walker & Company

Real Estate, are licensed real estate agents.
2.

Defendants John and Lesa York ("Yorks") are former owners o f a
1

commercial building located at 759 East Pacific Dn\e, American Fork, Utah ("the
Property").
3.

In June 2000 Yorks entered into a listing agreement with plaintiffs to sell

or lease the Property for them.
4.

After the term of that listing agreement ended, in March 2001 the Yorks

signed a second listing agreement (the "Modified Listing Agreement").
5.

The Modified Listing Agreement provides that "if the Property is sold to a

tenant during the term of the lease or within 180 days of expiration of the lease or any
renewals thereof, the Seller shall pay to The Company [plaintiffs] a commission equal to
six percent (6%) of the sale price." fl| 2.)
6.

In July 2001, the Yorks entered into a lease of the property with Utah

Valley State College (UVSC) and Mountainland Advanced Technology Center (MATC).
The lease provided for a lease term of eleven years.
7.

The lease was signed by Brad Cook as representative of both institutions.

8.

At the time the lease was entered into MATC and UVSC each were

legislatively created institutions of higher education.
9.

At the time of the lease, MATC was an arm of UVSC and UVSC

administered MATC's finances, payroll, and tuition.
10.

Subsequently MATC was made a subsidiary of Utah Applied Technology

college and was renamed Mountainland Applied Technology College.
11.

As a result of this action, MATC became independent of UVSC and was

granted its own budget.
2

*•.

.133 fl

12.

'

* fit :MII: !:.! lis chai ige in its stall is, I » \ * I 'C c : -i tint 1 :: :l ! :> pa; ' i: ei it t :) the Yoi 1 :s

and use the Property.
13.

"' fitei about V > 'c yeai s I I :>bei t Bren is, pi esidei it; of 1" • ! !i I C, approached the

Yorks about the purchase of the Property by MATC.
14

MATC was unable to purchase the Property at the time because it did not

budget for such capital purchases and it required prior approval of the legislature before it

»rdrr to u n|d the necessity of legislative approval, MATC sought out
Alpine School District ("Alpine"), another legislatively created educational entity with
has autonomous ability to raise money 'ind purchase nn pi 11
16

Alpine w as interested in helping MATC acquire property and retain its

location becai
MATC.
17

Alpine purchased the Property foi $2,656,000 and then entered into a

lea^c-nurchase agreement \
I he lease-purchase agreement signed May 14, 2004, between Alpine and
l\ 1 " ' 1 C pi : • ides ii I i el s 'ai it pai il:
A.

The term of the lease is 12 years and 7 months,

B.

M.-wv i j a s u . i u ^ M iiiai itlusal to purchase the Property at any time.

C.

The purchase price c I: the Proper ty decreases steadily accoi ding to a fixed
schedule and becomes $0 by the end of the lease term. Thus, if MATC

makes all of the lease payments, at the end of the lease Alpine must
transfer the Property to MATC without further payment of any type.
D.

The total amount of rent payments from MATC to Alpine over the entire
term of the lease amount to 54,075,889.02, which, over the lease term, is
roughly equivalent to 4.25% interest compounded annually over the price
for which Alpine purchased the Property.

E.

MATC may terminate the lease early only at two specified times without
being in default - the fourth year and the seventh year.

F.

If MATC chooses to terminate the lease early, it must reimburse Alpine
any unused real estate commission paid by Alpine.

G.

If the agreement is terminated either voluntarily or by default, MATC will
surrender the property to Alpine.

19.

From both tax and financial accounting standpoints, the lease is a capital

lease, which is the equivalent of a purchase. This is so because the primary determinant,
from both financial and tax accounting standpoints, is the amount of the residual that
must be paid at the conclusion of the lease term in order for the tenant to purchase the
property. If the residual is 10% of the purchase price or less, the lease will be treated as a
purchase for tax and financial accounting. Here the residual is zero. Thus, this lease
must be treated as disguised purchase by the tenant as all it must do to acquire the
property is to make its monthly rent payments, all of which are credited toward the
ultimate purchase price of the Property.
20.

Senator Curtis Bramble, a Utah State Senator and an accountant, testified
4

• •\.:)337

about

the intent of the legislature with respect to applied technology colleges acquiring

real property through lease/purchases rather than outright purchases because by the
lc-.-p.. ....

.

'.

for major college facilities, but the properties nonetheless could be acquired over time by
making lease/purchase payments.
21.

MATC and Alpine did not at any relevant time have rights to control each

other's decisions nor funds, nor did they share profits or losses from any transactions at
issi le.

22.

this case the sale to Alpine was for the sum of 52,656,000 If a

commission of c. „ is applied

commissioi i

.

. hid i is 6C! i>

of$2,656,000.
23.
t:•

The Modified Listing Agreement provides that if either party has to resort

: i I t :) p i • : t 2 ;::!: III! i sii I igl its \ ii i ;i ::"! tin •» Moment they ai e entitled to an award of

attorney's fees.
24

1 in: i this case plaintiffs have incurred attorney's fees in prosecuting their

claim to a commission.

'I nal] sis and II tiling
The resolution of this matter hangs on one question: Did the sale to Alpine,
combined with the lease-purchase agreement between Alpine and IV L V I C, amount to a
sale to MATC? If so, plaintiffs are entitled to a commission on that sale; if not, no
commission is due.
5

In order to prevail, plaintiffs must overcome the fact that the tenant, MATC, and
the purchaser, Alpine, are separate legal entities. The plaintiffs sought to overcome this
fact in two ways. Plaintiffs first theory focused on the cooperation between the entities,
alleging that Alpine and MATC were in a partnership and bought the property on behalf
of the partnership. Plaintiffs second theory focused on the nature of the lease-purchase
agreement between Alpine and MATC, arguing that it constituted a purchase by MATC.
I consider plaintiffs arguments in order, rejecting the first and accepting the second.
A.

Despite their cooperation, the purchase by Alpine alone is not a
purchase by MATC.

The evidence produced at trial established that Alpine bought the Property for the
benefit of MATC and in cooperation with MATC. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that this
cooperation does not make Alpine and MATC partners nor joint venturers in the legal
sense that makes one liable for the actions of the other. Although Alpine was acting on
behalf of MATC, the Modified Listing Agreement provides for a commission only where
the tenant itself, not someone acting on the tenant's behalf, purchases the Property.
1.

Alpine and MATC did not act in a joint venture because they
did not share control, profits, or losses nor have a profit
motive.

The law restricts the term partnership or joint venture to specific types of
relationships because those terms make the parties involved liable for each other's
actions. In order to bring such liability upon each other, partners or joint venturers
normally must have "a mutual right to control, a right to share in the profits," and "a duty
to share in any losses which may be sustained." Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982

6

activities must be "for the piuposc of niakiim a piofit " ;d Plaintiffs correctly point <>u
tl lat there must r^ „ commi miL c: . .iwi-j.. ;.. \\^ ;:•-::• .:n.:i.. . I-JI a pannersnip c:

;

r.;:

veiiture to exist, /,-.' hut in saving this, the case law merely explains or supplements the
requirements of profit-motive and mutual control. I Iere, M A I C and Alpine had no
i i n iti; ial i igl its :)f c :)i iti c 11 I :)i coi i lmii iglii ig of fi n ids. I I leii pi in i lai }< i: i ioti\- e, i at! lei tl lai i
profit, is the educational benefit to the students. The only profit involved, if any, is the
4 . 0 " o annual \A

.

t

relationship one would not expect of partners.
2.

The language of the Modified Listing Agreement does not
provide for a commission based on-cooperation alone.

Since Alpine and MATC were not partners nor joint venturers, the sale to Alpine
does not trigger tl le clause ii i the Modif ied Listing Agreement providing for a commission
if the Property is "sold to a tenant," even though Alpine was clearly acting on behalf of
the tenant MATC. I am aware of precedent in other jurisdictions that has awarded a real
estate coi :t tn lissi :)i :i • 1 lei c apei soi i actii ig oi i
tenant's use, but that precedent applies only when the real estate agreement provides for
that situation specifically. See Ackerrnan v. Citron, lMi A. M iU(NJ 1WJ)
(commission awarded when agreement allowed commission for a sale to "anyone acting
on the tenant's behalf," and tenant corporation's president bought property for the

(3d Cir. 1983) (no commission awarded where chairman of board purchased property in

/

behalf of tenant corporation, because contract did not specifically so provide). Thus, the
sale to Alpine alone is not a sale to MATC despite Alpine's cooperation with MATC.
B.

The lease between Alpine and MATC was in fact an installment
purchase.

Although I have rejected the notion that the relationship between Alpine and
MATC makes the sale to Alpine a sale to the tenant MATC, I am persuaded that MATC
did in fact purchase the property, and a commission therefore is due. Specifically, the
lease-purchase agreement between Alpine and MATC purports to be a lease, but is in fact
an installment purchase by MATC. Although I am normally hesitant to construe a
document to be anything other than what it purports to be on its face, I am convinced that
doing so is the proper course in this case.
1.

This court looks to state commercial law for guidance in
distinguishing a true lease from a disguised installment sale.

The idea of construing a lease-purchase agreement as an installment sale is not the
invention of this court. Significantly, a recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary under
the definition of "lease-purchase agreement" states, "[s]uch a lease is usu[ally] treated as
an installment sale." Black's Law Dictionary Lease-Purchase Agreement 900 (7th ed.
1999). The dictionary entry appears to focus on the sale of goods and is consistent with
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(37)(b), part of the Uniform Commercial Code which sets
forth standards for construing lease-purchase agreements as installment sales reserving a
security interest. According to the Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting that statute:
When a commercial transaction for the sale of equipment is in the form of
a lease but in fact is intended to be a sale, the payments, even though
called 'lease payments,' are legally considered installment payments on
8
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the purchase price. At the end of such a "lease," thei e is either a nominal
payment required to exercise the option to purchase or a final payment
which, although sizeable in relation to the value of the goods, leaves the
lessee no economic alternative but to exercise the option.
(2 • n ( mi a / easing

< : « >. \ ' I « '//• si n B) < > : •. C onsu

C < > , ; 31 I 2K 1483. 485 (1986).

Alt!lough there is no I Jtah statute extending the reasoning of CCA § 7UA-1201(3 7)(b) f i oi i i tl ie sale oi goods to the sale oi real estate, a; .ca&t unc lcderai judge, in
construing a real estate lease-purchase agreement for piirposes of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act, has held that "[i]n drawing a distinction between disguised sales and true
h .i

-.'

Corp . 5 4 1 ] \ Supp 3u2. 305 ;0(> (i I * >u. 1982), appeal

Colonial Securities
WiUiOin

.;\\>

;;..

dismissed

.

The issue in Davis was that certain disclosure provisions would apply if the
transaction was a sale, but would not apply if the transaction was a lease. In deciding that

the right to purchase the premises for the nominal consideration of $1.00" at the end of
the lease term o f t e n years, arid was fui tl lei persuaded becaiise ' tl le rental payments were
effectively credited towards the eventual purchase price. Thus, plaintiff acquired an
equity interest in the as the payments were m a d e . " Id.- at 306. The "mere fact that the

2.

The terms of the lease-purchase agreement between Alpine and
M A T C is, in substance, an installment sale.

Tl le ter i i is :)f tl ic lease agreei iniei it tl lat 111 le ji idge in D i i i s foi u I :I sigi rificai it ai e
substantially similar to the terms of the lease between Alpine and M A T C in the present

9

case. MATC has the option to buy the Property at any time during the lease term of
twelve years and seven months, and the price for which MATC would buy the property
diminishes steadily each month until it becomes zero at the end of the term. The sum of
the entire amount of rent paid over twelve years and seven months is equivalent to the
purchase price with an average rate of 4.5% interest compounded annually, a favorable
interest rate for a purchaser. Thus, MATC, unlike a renter, receives an equity interest in
the property with each payment. The fact that MATC has the option to surrender the
property at two points in time without being held in default does not alter the fact that
MATC is acquiring such equity. Since "[i]t is the duty of the court to look to substance
rather than to form," MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995), the lease
between Alpine and MATC should be treated as an installment sale to MATC. Alpine's
role in the transaction is only that of a financier.
C.

MATC's purchase triggers a commission under the Modified Listing
Agreement because it occurred within the term of MATC's lease.

The Modified Listing Agreement provides that a commission is due if sale to a
tenant occurs during the term of the tenant's lease or within 180 days of the expiration of
that term. No credible evidence was presented showing that the Modified Listing
Agreement was not valid. Although the Property was sold to Alpine before Alpine sold it
to MATC, the intermittent sale in my view does not alter the fact that the tenant
purchased the Property. Since the tenant's purchase occurred during the term of the lease,
the provision of the Modified Listing Agreement regarding the sale to a tenant is triggered
by the purchase. A commission of six percent of the sale price, or $159,360 is due under

10

the terms of the Modified Listing Agreement.
As well, the Modified Listing Agreement provides for an award of attorney's fees
to the prevailing party in litigation under the agreement. Here plaintiffs have prevailed,
have incurred attorney's fees, and are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees in
this matter. Their counsel should promptly prepare an affidavit of attorney's fees and file
with the court.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that MATC was a tenant procured by the
plaintiffs, which then purchased the Property within the term of the lease. Plaintiffs are
due a commission for the subsequent sale. Plaintiffs also are entitled to an award of
attorney's fees. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs'
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this _[[_ day of January, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

'.'.- -;....;".

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
*
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ADDENDUM "4

CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Section
53B-2-101.
53B-2-104.

53B-2-106.

Section
Institutions of higher education
— Corporate bodies — Powers.
Memberships of board of trustees — Terms — Vacancies —
Oath — Officers — Bylaws —
Quorum — Committees —
Compensation.
Duties and responsibilities of

53B-2-107.
53B-2-108.
53B-2-109.

the president of each institution — Approval by board of
trustees.
Appropriations reallocation.
Appropriations reallocation.
Notice to local government
when constructing student
housing.

53B-2-101. Institutions of higher education — Corporate
bodies — Powers.
(1) The following institutions of higher education are bodies politic and
corporate with perpetual succession and with all rights, immunities, and
franchises necessary to function as such:
(a) the University of Utah;
(b) Utah State University;
(c) Weber State University;
(d) Southern Utah University;
(e) Snow College;
(f) Dixie State College of Utah;
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(g) the College of Eastern Utah;
(h) Utah Valley State College;
(i) Salt Lake Community College; and
(j) the Utah College of Applied Technology.
(2) (a) Each institution may have and use a corporate seal and may, subject
to Section 53B-20-103, take, hold, lease, sell, and convey real and personal
property as the interest of the institution requires.
(b) Each institution is vested with all the property, franchises, and
endowments of, and is subject to, all the contracts, obligations, and
liabilities of its respective predecessor.
(c) (i) Each institution may enter into business relationships or dealings with private seed or venture capital entities or partnerships
consistent with Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 29, Subsection
(2).
(ii) A business dealing or relationship entered into under Subsection (2)(c)(i) does not preclude the private entity or partnership from
participating in or receiving benefits from a venture capital program
authorized or sanctioned by the laws of this state, unless otherwise
precluded by the specific law that authorizes or sanctions the program.
(iii) Subsections (2)(c)(i) and (ii) also apply to the Utah College of
Applied Technology created in Title 53B, Chapter 2a, U t a h College of
Applied Technology.
History: C. 1953,53B-2-101, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 7, § 8; 1987, ch. 167, § 12; 1990, ch.
12, § 3; 1990, ch. 13, § 2; 1994, ch. 63, § 2;
2000, ch. 7, § 2; 2005, ch. 89, § 1; 2005, ch.
227, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 2005 amendment by ch. 89, effective May 2, 2005, added
Subsection (2)(c).

The 2005 amendment by ch. 227, effective
May 2, 2005, added Subsection (IXj), making a
related change.
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.

53B-2a-105. Utah College of Applied Technology — Composition.
The Utah College of Applied Technology is composed of the following college
campuses:
(1) the Bridge rland Applied Technology College Campus which serves
the geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Box Elder School District;
(b) the Cache School District;
(c) the Logan School District; and
(d) the Rich School District;
(2) the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology College Campus which serves
the geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Ogden City School District; and
(b) the Weber School District;
(3) the Davis Applied Technology College Campus which serves the
geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Davis School District; and
(b) the Morgan School District;
(4) the Salt Lake/Tooele Applied Technology College Campus which
serves the geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Salt Lake City School District;
(b) the Granite School District;
(c) the Jordan School District;
(d) the Murray School District; and
(e) the Tooele School District;
(5) the Mountainland Applied Technology College Campus which serves
the geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Alpine School District;
(b) the Nebo School District;
(c) the Provo School District;
(d) the South Summit School District;
(e) the North Summit School District;
(f) the Wasatch School District; and
(g) the Park City School District;
(6) the Uintah Basin Applied Technology College Campus which serves
the geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Daggett School District;
(b) the Duchesne School District; and
(c) the Uintah School District;
(7) the Southwest Applied Technology College Campus which serves the
geographic area encompassing:
(a) the Beaver School District;
(b) the Garfield School District;
(c) the Iron School District; and
(d) the Kane School District;
(8) the Dixie Applied Technology College Campus which serves the
geographic area encompassing the Washington School District; and
(9) the Southeast Applied Technology College Campus which serves the
geographic area encompassing:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

53B-2a-106

the Carbon School District;
the Emery School District;
the Grand School District; and
the San Juan School District.

History: C. 1953, 53B-2a-105, enacted by
L. 2001 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 20; 2003, ch. 233,
§ 5; 2003, ch. 289, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment by ch. 233, effective July 1, 2003, deleted
former Subsection (7), listing the Central Applied Technology College and the school districts in the geographic area it served, and
redesignated the following subsections accordingly.
The 2003 amendment by ch. 289, effective
July 1, 2003, substituted "college campuses" for
"regional applied technology colleges'* in the

introductory phrase and made related changes
in terminology throughout; deleted Subsection
(b) from Subsections (1) to (6), (8), and (10),
pertaining to the inclusion of "facilities, equipment, and personnel" of the listed institutions;
made changes in subsection designations; and
made stylistic changes.
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel
Effective Dates. — Laws 2001 (1st S.S.), ch.
5, § 35 makes the act effective on September 1,
2001.

53B-2a-113. College campuses — Leasing authority —
Lease-purchase agreements — Report.
(1) In accordance with Subsection 53B-2a-112(2), a college campus may
enter into a lease with other higher education institutions, public school
districts, state agencies, or business and industry for a term of:
(a) one year or less with the approval of the campus board of directors;
and
(b) more than one year with the approval of the board of trustees and:
(i) the approval of funding for the lease by the Legislature prior to
a college campus entering into the lease; or
(ii) the lease agreement includes language that allows termination
of the lease without penalty.
(2) (a) In accordance with Subsection 53B-2a-112(2), a college campus may
enter into a lease-purchase agreement if:
(i) there is a long-term benefit to the state;
(ii) the project is included in both the campus and Utah College of
Applied Technology master plans;
(iii) the lease-purchase agreement includes language that allows
termination of the lease;
(iv) the lease-purchase agreement is approved by the campus board
of directors and the board of trustees; and
(v) the lease-purchase agreement is:
(A) reviewed by the Division of Facilities Construction and
Management;
(B) reviewed by the State Building Board; and
(C) approved by the Legislature.
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(b) An approval under Subsection (2)(a) shall include a recognition of:
(i) all parties, dates, and elements of the agreement;
(ii) the equity or collateral component that creates the benefit; and
(hi) the options dealing with the sale and division of equity.
(3) (a) Each college campus shall provide an annual lease report to the
board of trustees that details each of its leases, annual costs, location,
square footage, and recommendations for lease continuation.
(b) The president of the Utah College of Applied Technology shall
compile and distribute an annual combined lease report for all college
campuses to the Division of Facilities Construction Management and to
others upon request.
(4) The Utah College of Applied Technology shall use the annual combined
lease report in determining planning, utilization, and budget requests.
History: C. 1953, 53B-2a-113, enacted by
L. 2003, ch. 289, § 17; 2005, ch. 227, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, added Subsections

(l)(b)(i) to (2)(b)(iii) and made related changes.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2003, ch. 289r § 20
makes the act effective on July 1, 2003.

ADDENDUM "5

STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073)
J. BRYAN QUESENBERRY (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TOM HEAL COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE, INC., and WALKER &
COMPANY REAL ESTATE,
Plaintiffs,

;
;)
])

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

vs.

]

JOHN YORK and LESA YORK,

]>

Case No. 040402039

)>

Division No. 8

Defendants.

The Court, having held a bench trial in the above-captioned matter on November 3, 2005,
with all parties present, Plaintiffs being represented by Stephen Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson &
Schmutz, and Defendants being represented by Donald E. McCandless of Scribner &
McCandless; and having heard all witnesses presented by the parties, having received evidence
as set forth in the record, and having heard the arguments of the parties, hereby makes the
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following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs, Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate and Walker & Company Real

Estate, are licensed real estate agents in the State of Utah.
2.

Defendants John and Lesa York ("Yorks") are former owners of a commercial

building and associated real property located at 759 East Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah
County, Utah ("the Property").
3.

In June 2000, the Yorks entered into a listing agreement with plaintiffs to sell or

lease the Property for them. The initial listing price in that agreement was $2.3 million. This
listing agreement was admitted as Exhibit 2.
4.

After the term of that listing agreement ended, the Yorks signed a second listing

agreement (the "Modified Listing Agreement") in March 2001. This Agreement was admitted as
Exhibit 3.
5.

Paragraph 2 of the Modified Listing Agreement provides that "if the Property is

sold to a tenant during the term of the lease or within 180 days of expiration of the lease or any
renewals thereof, the Seller shall pay to The Company [plaintiffs] a commission equal to six
percent (6%) of the sale price."
6.

Clay Christensen (of Alpine School District ("Alpine)) first contacted the listing

1

These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law incorporate by reference the Court's January 11, 2006
Ruling, and also supplement said Ruling.
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real estate agents (i.e. Plaintiffs) on or about April 16, 2001 in conjunction with the lease and sale
that are at issue in this lawsuit (which was several weeks after the signing of the Modified Listing
Agreement). Tom Heal and Blaine Walker showed the property to him. Mr. Christensen was
followed by others negotiating on behalf of Mountainland Applied Technology Center (MATC).
7. A negotiation period ensued between MATC and Plaintiffs, as demonstrated by
various letters that were introduced as Exhibits 4, 5 and 7. Exhibit 4 is the first letter of intent
relating to the eventual leasing of the properties, and is dated April 23, 1001. Exhibit 5 is a May
9, 2001 letter addressed from the Yorks' agent, Tom Heal, to Royanne Boyer, Dean of
Mountainland Advanced Technology Center. Exhibit 7 is a letter from Brad Cook of Utah
Valley State College (UVSC) to Commissioner Cecelia Foxley, of the Utah System of Higher
Education. In this letter, Mr. Cook refers to "an initiative of the Mountainland Applied
Technology Center Service Region (MATCSR) Board and Alpine School District" when
discussing the subject property.
8.

At all times pertinent hereto, Alpine had a vested interest in making sure that

MATC could remain at the Property, and did what it could to make sure that happened.
9.

In July 2001, the Yorks entered into a lease of the property with UVSC and

MATC. The lease provided for a term of ten years. This lease was admitted as Exhibit 6. The
lease was signed by Mr. Cook as representative of both institutions. This lease was signed within
the term of the Modified listing agreement. Rob Brems, the President of MATC, considered

3

• •.

J4 1 4

MATC to be the tenant.
10.

At the time the lease was entered into, MATC and UVSC each were legislatively-

created institutions of higher education.
11.

At the time of the lease, MATC was an arm of UVSC and UVSC administered

MATC's finances, payroll, and tuition.
12.

Subsequently MATC was made a subsidiary of Utah Applied Technology College

and was renamed Mountainland Applied Technology College (still referred to herein as
"MATC").
13.

As a result of this action, MATC became independent of UVSC and was granted

its own budget.
14.

After this change in its status, MATC continued to pay rent to the Yorks and

occupy the Property. MATC corresponded with the Yorks about the property. For example,
Exhibit 8 is a letter from Ms. Boyer to Mr. York about certain tenant improvements that MATC
wanted to make. Exhibit 12 is a letter from Mr. Brems to an appraiser, wherein Mr. Brems
acknowledges that MATC leases the subject property from the Yorks.
15.

After about two years, Mr. Brems approached the Yorks about the purchase of the

Property by MATC. Purchasing the Property was Mr. Brems' idea and project, which he came
up with during the term of the lease. Mr. York then called Mr. Heal and told him that MATC
had made an offer to purchase the property, and asked Mr. Heal to participate in analyzing the

4
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offer. After performing an analysis of the offer, Mr. Heal suggested that the sales price should be
$2.6 million (MATCs first offer was only $2,000,050, as set forth in Exhibit 9).
16.

MATC was unable to purchase the Property on its own at the time because it did

not have the right (independent of legislative action) to acquire real property, it did not have a
budget for such capital purchases, and it required prior approval of the legislature before it could
make real property purchases.
17.

In order to avoid the necessity and difficulty of obtaining legislative approval,

MATC sought out Alpine, another legislatively-created, state-funded educational entity which
has autonomous ability to raise money and purchase property.
18.

Alpine was interested in helping MATC acquire property and retain its location

because many of Alpine's high school students receive vocational training from MATC. In fact,
a large percentage of MATCs students came from Alpine, and received services from MATC
that were only available there.
19.

Alpine, as set forth above, to facilitate MATC purchasing the property, advanced

the funds, and closed on the Property for $2,600,0002 on May 27, 2004.
20.

Two weeks before this date, on May 14, 2004, Alpine and MATC entered into a

lease-purchase agreement (trial exhibit 16), which provides, in relevant part:

2

Through the efforts, expertise and counsel of Plaintiff Tom Heal, Yorks were able to
ask for and obtain $300,000 more in price for the property than the property had been previously
listed for ($2,300,000).
5
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A.

The term of the lease is 12 years and 7 months.

B.

MATC has a right of first refusal to purchase the Property at any time.

C.

The purchase price of the Property decreases steadily and proportionately
according to a fixed schedule and becomes $0 by the end of the lease term.
Thus, if MATC makes all of the lease payments, at the end of the lease
Alpine must transfer the Property to MATC without further payment of
any type (i.e. title automatically transfers upon payment of all the lease
payments).

D.

The total amount of rent payments from MATC to Alpine over the entire
term of the lease amount was $4,075,889.02, which is roughly equivalent
to 4.25% interest per annum over the price for which Alpine purchased the
Property.

E.

If the lease is terminated either voluntarily or by default, MATC will
surrender the property to Alpine but receive a reimbursement.3

21.

From both tax and financial accounting standpoints, the lease is an installment

sale or a "capital lease", which is the equivalent of a purchase. This is so because the primary

3

The evidence also established that Mr. Brems both had the idea for the purchase and negotiated the terms
of the purchase with the Yorks. Mr. Brems obtained and paid for the appraisal used in the purchase from the Yorks.
Mr. Brems figured out the unique financing mechanism which was eventually used by MATC to obtain the building.
MATC paid 25% of the purchase price and acted like an owner in every way under the lease option, taking on any
and all obligations associated with the property. MATC provided the same services, in the same way, to its students
from the first day of the lease with the Yorks until the time of trial, with no plans to change.
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determinant, from both financial and tax accounting standpoints, is the amount of the residual
that must be paid at the conclusion of the lease term in order for the tenant to purchase the
property. If the residual is 10% of the purchase price or less, the lease will be treated as a
purchase for tax and financial accounting. Here the residual is zero. Thus, this lease must be
treated as a "disguised" purchase by the tenant as all it must do to acquire the Property is to make
its monthly rent payments, all of which are credited toward the ultimate purchase price of the
Property.
22.

Senator Curtis Bramble, a Utah State Senator and a certified public accountant,

testified about the intent of the legislature with respect to applied technology colleges acquiring
real property through lease/purchases rather than outright purchases. He explained that through
the lease/purchase mechanism the legislature did not have to fund a capital purchase budget for
major college facilities. Meanwhile, the properties nonetheless could be acquired over time by
making installment or lease/purchase payments. Senator Bramble testified (and was not
contradicted by any other witness) that the lease/purchase transaction was actually a purchase by
MATC with Alpine acting as the lender.
23.

MATC and Alpine did not at any relevant time have rights to control each other's

decisions or funds. Nor did they share profits or losses from any transactions at issue. The
evidence showed that MATC contributed $620,000 of the purchase price to the Yorks (see trial
exhibit 11, addendum B, and trial exhibit 15 which detail this payment). The sale occurred
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during the term of the Modified Listing Agreement by being within the term of the original lease
from the Yorks to MATC. The Court is persuaded that MATC did in fact purchase the Property,
and a commission therefore is due. Specifically, the lease-purchase agreement between Alpine
and MATC purports to be a lease, but is in fact an installment purchase by MATC (and MATC
was the tenant on the original lease).
24.

In this case the sale to MATC (facilitated by Alpine) was for the sum of

$2,600,000. If the contractually-determined commission of 6% is applied, the commission will
be $156,000, which is 6% of $2,600,000. The Yorks have refused to pay this commission to
Plaintiffs.
25.

The Modified Listing Agreement provides that if either party has to resort to

litigation to protect their rights under the agreement, they are entitled to an award of attorney's
fees.
26.

In this case Plaintiffs have incurred attorney's fees in prosecuting their claim to a

commission.
27. The Modified Listing Agreement also provides that "[a]ny commissions due under
the terms of this agreement that are not paid within five days of due date shall be subject to a ten
percent late penalty and shall bare [sic] interest at the rate of two percent per month until paid."
28. The commission was not paid within five days of due date, which was the closing of
the sale (settlement date) - i.e. May 27, 2004 (see trial exhibit 17). Ten percent of the $156,000
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commission is $15,600, for a total commission and penalty owing of $171,600. Interest on that
sum at the rate of two percent per month is $112.83 per day (based on a 365 day year).
29. The Court, having weighed the evidence and having observed all witnesses as they
testified, finds that the Yorks have not met their burden of proof on the affirmative defenses of
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, lack of consideration, unconscionability,
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties (as set forth in paragraph 35 of the Answer). No credible
evidence was presented showing that the Modified Listing Agreement was not valid. The Court
further finds that Plaintiffs will not receive a "double commission" as claimed by the Yorks, but
rather will receive what was anticipated by the contract between the parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions of
Law:
1. Exhibit 3, the Modified Listing Agreement, was a valid, binding contract, supported
by consideration.
2. Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations under said agreement.
3. The Defendants breached said agreement by failing to pay the commission set forth
therein, and Plaintiffs were damaged as set forth above, and are entitled to thus receive their
commission, penalty, interest and attorneys fees as set forth in the contract.
4. The Court find that judgment should be entered against the Yorks and in favor of the
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Plaintiffs in the amount of $156,000 for the commission, $15,600 for the penalty, and interest at
the rate of two percent per month (which is $112.83 per day based on a 365 day year). As of
January 31, 2006, the total interest due would be $69,382.78. This will increase by the amount
of $112.83 until ajudgment is entered. Thereafter, the entire judgment shall bear interest at the
rate of 24% per annum until paid (as 2% per month is the contract rate of interest), and as set
forth in U.C.A §15-1-4, " . . . ajudgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the
contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment."
5. Plaintiffs, as the prevailing party, should be awarded their reasonable attorney's fees
and costs under the terms of the Modified Listing Agreement, and shall be able to collect the
costs and fees they incur in collecting on said judgment, as well as the costs and fees on appeal
should they prevail. The amount of attorneys fees shall be established by attorney affidavit
submitted by Plaintiff.
6. The Yorks have not met their burden of proof on any affirmative defense that they
have asserted in this matter.
ENTERED this ^ d a y of

rjt>W<L*i ,2006.

District Court Judge Anthony Schofield
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NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice of any objection to
the pleading above shall be submitted to the Court and counsel within five days after service. If
no such objection is so submitted, the Court may enter this order.

This proposed judgment is served by hand delivery on the Court and opposing counsel on
the 1st day of February, 2006.
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